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I.

INTRODUCTION

In. several respects, the U.S. tax system strives for neutral
taxation. Neutrality is often concerned with similarly taxing different
types of income that are economically equivalent.! For example, the
Internal Revenue Code (Code) taxes interest income in the form of
original issue discount prior to its receipt, regardless of whether the
taxpayer uses the accrual or cash method,2 because the instrument can
be viewed as economically equivalent to earning interest on a bank
3
account from which there are no withdrawals. There is also the view
that the law should be neutral in taxing different forms of conducting
business, so that business, rather than tax, considerations determine
4
the form of business operations. While the double taxation of C

* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Graduate Tax Program,
University of Baltimore School of Law; B.S. with high honors 1982, Rutgers
University; J.D. summa cum laude 1985, Georgetown University; LL.M. 1986, New
York University. I thank Walter Schwidetzky for reviewing and providing helpful
comments on a draft of this article. Any errors are solely the responsibility of the
author.
[ See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without
Realization: A "Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 727,
803-04 (1992) (proposing the taxation of certain investment assets by imposing a
minimum rate of return in order to tax investment assets more equally); Reed
Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 243, 336 (1992) (proposing a uniform framework to develop rules for consistent
treatment of financial instruments).
2 See 1.R.c. § 1272.
3 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ &
DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXA nON: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 729 (5th ed. 2005).
4 See Fred B. Brown, Federal Income Taxation of u.s. Branches of Foreign
Corporations: Separate Entity or Separate Rules?, 49 TAX L. REV. 133, 193 (1993).
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5

corporations is inconsistent with this view,6 the treatment of S
7
corporations and provisions aimed at equalizing the taxation of
8
branches and subsidiaries in the cross-border context promote tax
9
neutrality with respect to the form of conducting business.
10
The branch profits tax is an example of a provision directed at
achieving this latter type of neutrality. Enacted in 1986,11 the purpose
of the branch profits tax is to bring about more similar tax treatment
of foreign corporations operating in the United States through U.S.
12
branches and U.S. subsidiaries. The branch profits tax attempts to
promote neutrality by subjecting the U.S. branch earnings of a foreign
corporation to a second level of U.S. tax upon the deemed remittance
13
of the earnings outside of the U.S. branch. This is to approximate
the second-level tax that occurs in the subsidiary setting when a U.S.
14
subsidiary pays dividends to its foreign parent.
Unlike the dividend tax in the subsidiary setting, however, the
branch profits tax can apply even when all of a foreign corporation's
U.S. earnings are retained for use in the operations of the U.S.

See 1.R.c. §§ 301 et seq.
See generally DEPT. OF TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL ANO
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 3-5 (1992).
7 See 1.R.c. §§ 1361-1379.
8 See I.R.C. §§ 902, 904( d).
9 See United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U.S. 132, 135, 140
(1989) (pointing out that the legislative history of section 902 reflects an intent to
equalize treatment of U.S. corporations that operate through foreign subsidiaries and
those that operate through foreign branches); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX'N,
100TH CONGo 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986,
at 888 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter 1986 Bluebook] (stating that section 904(d) is
intended to bring about more equal foreign tax credit limitation treatment of income
earned through foreign branches and income earned through foreign subsidiaries); S.
REP. No. 1983, 85TH CONG., 20 SESS., at 87 (1958), reprinted in 1958-3 C.B. 922, 1137
(stating that one of the purposes for enacting subchapter S is to allow businesses to
choose their legal forms without undue tax influence).
IO I.R.C. § 884.
11 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1241(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2576
(1986).
12 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036-37; S. REP. No. 99-313, at 401 (1986),
reprinted in 1986-3 c.B. (Yo I. 3) 401; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 432 (1985), reprinted in
1986-3 c.B. (Yol. 2) 432.
13 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036-37; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note
12, at 403; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 433-34.
14 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036-37; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note
12, at 401; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 432-33.
5
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branch,15 what some commentators have referred to as a surtax
16
result. Moreover, a typical U.S. subsidiary has greater flexibility in
17
The more
retaining earnings as compared to a U.S. branch.
burdensome nature of the branch profits tax appears to create a tax
bias in favor of operating in the United States through U.S.
subsidiaries, so that foreign corporations can control the timing and
the impact of the second-level tax. IS Thus, as currently crafted, the
branch profits tax fails to promote neutrality adequately.
This article recommends certain changes to the branch profits tax
19
that advance the neutrality policy underlying the provision. More
specifically, the article proposes measures that provide foreign
corporations operating through U.S. branches with an ability to
control the timing and impact of the second-level tax that is similar to
that possessed by foreign corporations operating through U.S.
subsidiaries. While there may be other ways of achieving neutrality in
the imposition of second-level taxes,20 the article proposes measures
that make the branch profits tax more equivalent to the dividend tax
See Brown, supra note 4, at 196-97.
16 See
Institute of International Bankers Says to Liberalize Branch Tax
Regulations, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 7, 1988) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
elec. cit., 88 TNT 225-26) [hereinafter Institute of International Bankers Comments];
International Commercial Bank of China Rejects Method for Determining u.s. Net
Equity, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 11, 1989) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit.,
89 TNT 9-23) [hereinafter International Commercial Bank of China Comments];
KPMG Peat Marwick Suggests Modifications to the Branch Profits Tax Regulations as
Applied to Banking Institutions, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 12, 1989) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 89 TNT 10-15) [hereinafter Peat Marwick
Comments].
17 See infra Part III.B.
18 See, e.g., Michael Hirschfeld & Shaul Grossman, Opportunities for the Foreign
Investor in u.s. Real Estate - If Planning Comes First, 94 J. TAX'N 36,38-39 (2001).
In this regard, there may be many legitimate business reasons for using a branch
rather than a subsidiary for conducting a U.S. business. Cf Gary D. Sprague,
Application of Transfer Pricing Rules to Branches and Permanent Establishments Electronic Commerce and Intangible Property Aspects, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 971,
973 (2002) (listing possible business reasons for using a branch as opposed to a
subsidiary for foreign operations).
19 It should be emphasized that even with neutrality in the application of secondlevel taxes, there would still be significant differences in the taxation of U.S. branches
and U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations. See Brown, supra note 4, at 195-200.
More complete neutrality in taxing branches and subsidiaries could be realized by
treating a U.S. branch as a separate entity for tax purposes. See id. at 152-58, 193.
20 Possibilities range from imposing surtaxes without regard to remittances for
both branches and subsidiaries to partially or fully exempting such structures from
second-level taxes.
15
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that applies in the subsidiary setting, aiming to accomplish what
Congress apparently set out to do in enacting the branch profits tax as
Z1
a surrogate for the dividend tax. In addressing these reforms, the
article examines whether the proposed measures conflict with other
recognized policies governing the taxation of foreign corporations
with U.S. branches, ultimately concluding that they do not.
Part II of this article discusses the branch profits tax, its
underlying policy goals, and the conceptualization of a U.S. branch
that was used by Congress in enacting the provision. Part III
compares the branch profits tax to the dividend tax that applies in the
U.S. subsidiary setting, pointing out important substantive differences
in the operation of these taxes. These differences include the surtax
z
resule and the greater flexibility of U.S. subsidiaries in retaining
earnings.
Part IV then proposes and analyzes several changes to the branch
profits tax that would advance neutrality by having the branch profits
tax function more like the dividend tax. To address the surtax result,
this Part proposes two changes aimed at increasing the usefulness of
the current rule that permits a foreign corporation to avoid deemed
remittances of U.S. branch earnings by reducing the amount of
liabilities imputed to the U.S. branch. To enhance the flexibility of
U.S. branches in retaining earnings, this Part recommends providing
foreign corporations with an election to treat assets as "effectively
connected," that is, considered as belonging to the U.S. branch for tax
purposes. While these measures arguably conflict with the policies
underlying the rules for apportioning interest expense and
determining effectively connected income, an examination of the
potential conflicts suggests that the measures are consistent with these
21 The most direct way of modeling a dividend tax in the branch setting would be
to monitor and tax directly remittances made by the U.S. branch to other branches of
the foreign corporation. See 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX
PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION 145 (1987)
[hereinafter AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE]. Congress did not use this approach,
apparently because it felt that such an approach would not be feasible. See BORIS I.
BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 67198 (2003). Congress probably was also influenced by the fact that the United States
generally does not attach tax significance to interbranch transactions. Cf AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, supra, at 145 (rejecting a direct monitoring approach in part for this
reason). However, if the United States were to treat a U.S. branch as a separate
entity for tax purposes, which would include the recognition of interbranch
transactions, a direct approach for monitoring and taxing U.S. branch remittances
should be feasible and appropriate. See Brown, supra note 4, at 152-55.
22 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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and other recognized policies governing the taxation of foreign
corporations with U.S. branches. Part V summarizes and concludes
the article.
II. THE BRANCH PROFITS TAX AND ITS POLICY GOALS

Congress enacted the branch profits tax in order to reduce the
disparity between the taxation of U.S. subsidiaries and U.S. branches
23
of foreign corporations. In general, Congress believed that the same
substantive tax rules should apply to both forms of conducting a U.S.
24
A U.S. subsidiary of a foreign
business by foreign corporations.
25
corporation is subject to net basis U.S. taxation on its earnings. In
addition, a gross basis U.S. tax (collected by withholding) is imposed
26
on dividends paid by the U.S. subsidiary to the foreign parent. A
foreign corporation operating through a U.S. branch is also subject to
27
net basis U.S. taxation on its U.S. earnings. However, prior to the
enactment of the branch profits tax, there rarely was a second-level
U.S. tax on the distributed U.S. profits of a foreign corporation
23 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 12, at
401; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 432.
24 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 12, at
401.

25

See I.R.C. §11.

26 Under section 881(a), a foreign corporation generally is subject to a thirty
percent tax on U.S. source dividends (along with other FDAP income such as interest
and royalties), with the tax collected through withholding from the dividend payments
pursuant to section 1442(a). Dividends paid by a domestic corporation are usually
treated as U.S. source income. See 1.R.c. § 861(a)(2). The type of taxation imposed
under section 881(a), that is, gross income subject to flat rates with no allowance of
deductions, is referred to as gross basis taxation. Tax treaties may reduce or eliminate
the tax under section 881(a). See, e.g., UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX
CONVENTION OF SEPTEMBER 20, 1996, arts. 10-12, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstrty/usmodel.pdf [hereinafter MODEL CONVENTION].
27 Section 882(a) provides that a foreign corporation is subject to taxation under
section 11 on its taxable income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a
trade or business within the United States ("effectively connected taxable income").
See I.R.c. § 882(a). Effectively connected taxable income generally is defined as
effectively connected income less deductions that are properly allocated and
apportioned to such income pursuant to Treasury regulations.
See 1.R.c.
§ 882(c)(1)(A). Effectively connected income is generally income that bears some
connection to a foreign person's U.S. business. See 1.R.c. § 864(c); infra notes 109-38
and accompanying text. The type of taxation imposed under section 882(a), that is,
gross income less deductions, taxed at graduated rates, is referred to as net basis
taxation. Tax treaties may reduce or eliminate the tax under section 882(a). See, e.g.,
MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at arts. 5,7.
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28
operating in branch form. No U.S. tax was imposed on inter-branch
remittances of U.S. earnings. While a second-level withholding tax
was possible upon the payment of dividends by the foreign
corporation to its foreign shareholders, the withholding tax applied
only when at least fifty percent of the gross income of the foreign
29
corporation was effectively connected with its U.S. business. In this
regard, Congress understood that nearly all foreign corporations
operating in the United States through branches avoided the
withholding tax by keeping their U.S. income below the fifty percent
30
The result was that foreign corporations with U.S.
threshold.
branches were usually not subject to a second-level tax, while foreign
corporations with U.S. subsidiaries were, creating a tax incentive to
operate through a U.S. branch, thus violating tax neutrality. In this
regard, a second-level tax for U.S. branches functions as a backstop to
the dividend tax in U.S. subsidiary setting, as without it the dividend
tax could be avoided by using a U.S. branch to conduct U.S. business
31
activities.
Congress believed that simply reducing the threshold for applying
the withholding tax would not sufficiently reduce the disparity in the
32
taxation of U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries. In Congress's view,
a second-level tax should not depend on whether U.S. income rose to
some arbitrary level, and that such an approach presented
administrative problems because it was difficult to know when the tax
applied and difficult to enforce if it did apply.33 Instead, Congress
enacted a tax on the U.S. branch profits of a foreign corporation as a
substitute for the dividend tax that applies to a foreign corporation
with a U.S. subsidiary.34 Under the branch profits tax, a second-level
tax generally is imposed on the U.S. earnings of the foreign
35
corporation that are treated as remitted outside of the United States.
28 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036-37; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note
12, at 401; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 432.
29 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036-37; S. REP. NO. 99-313, supra note
12, at 401; H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, supra note 12, at 432.
30 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036-37; S. REP. NO. 99-313, supra note
12, at 401; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 432.
31
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 140-41.
32 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1037.
33 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036-37; S. REP. NO. 99-313, supra note
12, at 401-02; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 432-33.
34 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1037; S. REP. NO. 99-313, supra note 12, at
401-02; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 432-33.
35 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1037; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 12, at
403; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 433-34.
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Specifically, section 884(a) imposes a thirty percent tax on a
foreign corporation's dividend equivalent amount,36 that is, the U.S.
branch earnings that are treated as remitted outside of the United
37
States.
The dividend equivalent amount is defined as a foreign
corporation's earnings and profits for the year that is attributable to
its effectively connected income ("effectively connected E&P"),38
39
subject to two adjustments.
First, effectively connected E&P is
reduced by any increase in U.S. net equity for the year, and second,
this amount is increased by any annual reduction in U.S. net equity to
the extent of the aggregate amount of effectively connected E&P
40
accumulated in years after 1986. U.S. net equity is defined as U.S.
41
U.S. assets are generally assets that
assets less U.S. liabilities.

36 I.R.c. § 884(a). Tax treaties can eliminate or reduce the branch profits tax.
Specifically, many older treaties override the branch profits tax because of their
nondiscrimination articles, which generally prohibit a treaty country from taxing a
permanent establishment of a nonresident enterprise less favorably than a resident
enterprise carrying on the same activities. In this regard, Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(g)(3)
provides a list of countries whose treaties with the United States as of January 1, 1987
prevent the imposition of the branch profits tax, provided that the treaty remains in
effect and has not been modified after January 1, 1987 to expressly allow for the
imposition of the branch profits tax. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(g)(3) (1996). More recent
treaties (and some older treaties) allow for the imposition of the branch profits tax,
but reduce the rate of taxation to the rate applying to dividends paid to a foreign
corporation by a wholly-owned U.S. corporation, that rate typically being five or ten
percent. See, e.g., MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at art. 10, paras. 2(a), 9. The
Code makes direct provision for this as well. See I.R.c. § 884(e)(2); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.884-1(g)(4)(i)(A) (1996) (if the treaty does not specify a rate on branch profits, the
rate is the same as that which would apply under the treaty to dividends paid to a
foreign corporation by a wholly-owned U.S. corporation). To be entitled to treaty
benefits for purposes of the branch profits tax, a foreign corporation must meet the
requirements of the limitations on benefits provision (if any) contained in the treaty,
and in addition, either the foreign corporation is a qualified resident of the treaty
country within the meaning of section 884(e)(4) and Treas. Reg. § 1.884-5(a), or the
limitations on benefits provision, or an amendment thereto, entered into force after
December 31,1986. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4(g)(1) (1996).
37 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1039; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 12, at
403; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 433-34.
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(f) elaborates on the determination of effectively
connected E&P, which is similar to the determination of E&P of domestic
corporations except that effectively connected taxable income is used in lieu of
taxable income. Cf I.R.c. § 312.
39 See I.R.c. § 884(b).
40 [d.
41 See I.R.c. § 884(c)(1).
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produce effectively connected income,42 and U.S. liabilities are
essentially the liabilities attributed to the U.S. branch for purposes of
determining the interest expense deduction taken against effectively
43
connected income. These adjustments for changes in U.S. net equity
are aimed at measuring indirectly the effectively connected E&P that
44
is remitted by the U.S. branch outside of the United States.
In examining the branch profits tax for reforms in light of its
underlying policy, it is also important to consider Congress's
conceptualization of a U.S. branch that was used in enacting the
45
provision.
The purpose and structure of the branch profits tax
indicate that Congress viewed a U.S. branch of a foreign corporation
as a constructive U.S. subsidiary for purposes of imposing a second
46
level of U.S. tax on the earnings of the branch. The very fact that

42 See I.R.c. § 884(c)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d) (1996). See infra notes 101-38
and accompanying text for details on the definition of U.S. assets.
43 See I.R.c. § 884(c)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e) (1996). Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5
uses a three-step process to determine the amount of a foreign corporation's interest
expense deduction that is allocated and apportioned to effectively connected income.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 (1996). First, the foreign corporation determines the
average total value of its U.S. assets (which are generally defined the same as under
the branch profits tax). Second, the foreign corporation determines the amount of its
worldwide liabilities that are imputed to its U.S. business ("U.S.-connected
liabilities") by multiplying its U.S. assets by either (i) its actual worldwide liability-toasset ratio or (ii) a fixed ratio, which is ninety-three percent for banks and fifty
percent for foreign corporations other than banks or insurance companies. Finally,
the foreign corporation determines interest expense deduction by imputing an
interest rate to u.S.-connected liabilities using one of two possible methods (the
adjusted U.S. booked liabilities method or the separate currency pools method). For
purposes of determining U.S. net equity under the branch profits tax, U.S. liabilities
are generally defined as the amount of U.S.-connected liabilities (as defined under
Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5) if U.S.-connected liabilities were determined using the assets
and liabilities of the foreign corporation as of the close of the particular taxable year
(rather than the average amount of assets and liabilities for the year). See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.884-1 ( e )(1) (1996).
44 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1039.
45 See Steven A. Musher, Coping with the Branch Tax Temporary Regulations:
Part I, 71 J. TAX'N 110, 115 (1989) (likening a U.S. branch to a "shadow" U.S.
subsidiary and using this comparison to measure how well the regulations achieve
parallel treatment of U.S branches and subsidiaries). This analogy, along with the
underlying policy identified above, will form the basis for the reforms recommended
in this article.
46 See Peter H. Blessing, The Branch Tax, 40 TAX LAW. 587, 590 n.23 (1987);
Richard L. Doernberg, Legislative Override of Income Tax Treaties.' The Branch
Profits Tax and Congressional Arrogation of Authority, 42 TAX LAW. 173, 176 n.26
(1989); Fred Feingold & Mark E. Berg, Whither the Branches?, 44 TAX L. REV. 205,
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Congress enacted the provision in order to reduce the disparity
between the taxation of U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries suggests
that Congress considered these two forms of conducting a U.S.
business as equivalents for certain tax purposes. Because the two
forms are considered equivalents, concerns of tax neutrality call for
more similar tax treatment with regard to exacting a second level of
tax on U.S. earnings. The structure of the tax Congress enacted
supports this reading as well. The determination of a "dividend
equivalent amount," which imputes the remittance of earnings from
the U.S. branch, is modeled on the determination of a dividend, which
similarly tracks the distribution of earnings from a U.S. subsidiary.47
Indeed, other provisions contained within section 884 expressly
treat a U.S. branch as a constructive U.S. subsidiary for certain tax
purposes. Section 884( e )(2) provides that for purposes of applying
income tax treaties to reduce the rate of the branch profits tax, the
treaty rate will be that which applies to dividends paid to the foreign
corporation by a wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary, if the treaty does not
48
specify a rate on branch profits. In addition, for purposes of sourcing
interest income, section 884(f)(1)(A) treats interest paid by a U.S.
branch of a foreign corporation as if it were paid by a U.S.
49
corporation. Section 884(f)(1)(B) further provides that to the extent
that a foreign corporation's interest expense deduction under Treas.
50
Reg. § 1.882_5 exceeds the interest paid by the U.S. branch, the
excess interest will be taxable as if the amounts were paid to the
foreign corporation by a wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary.51 Similar to

209 (1989).
47 See Musher, supra note 45, at 110.
48 As noted earlier, a foreign corporation that is resident of a treaty country
would need to satisfy certain requirements in order for the treaty to eliminate or
reduce the foreign corporation's liability under the branch profits tax. See supra note
36.
49 1.R.c. § 884(f)(1)(A). Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4(b) provides rules for determining
the interest that is paid by a U.S. branch ("branch interest"). See Treas. Reg. § 1.8844(b) (1996). In general, branch interest is defined as interest paid by the foreign
corporation on its U.S. booked liabilities. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4(b )(1) (1996). See
infra note 69 for a description of U.S. booked liabilities.
50 See supra note 43.
51 1.R.c. § 884(f)(1)(B).
Accordingly, the excess interest generally will be
subject to a thirty percent tax in the absence of a treaty reduction or exemption. See
I.R.C. § 881(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4(a)(2). Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4 contains specific
rules for implementing the so-called excess interest tax, including an exemption from
the tax and its coordination with treaty provisions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4(a)(2),
(c)(3) (1996). With respect to foreign banks, at least eighty-five percent of the bank's
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the branch profits tax, these interest provisions aim to promote
neutrality by ensuring that a deduction for interest allowed against the
U.S. tax base generally gives rise to an interest inclusion subject to
U.S. tax, which is the case in the context of a U.S. subsidiary.52
III. THE BRANCH PROFITS TAX VERSUS THE DIVIDEND TAX

There are obvious differences in the methods used for exacting a
second level of U.S. tax on remittances of earnings in the U.S. branch
and subsidiary settings. As described above, the branch profits tax
employs a formulary approach to determine (and tax) remittances of
effectively connected E&P by the U.S. branch to other branches of
53
In contrast, the dividend tax applies to
the foreign corporation.
54
actual distributions by a U.S. subsidiary to its foreign parent. From
the standpoint of neutrally applying a second-level tax, using different
methods for the branch and subsidiary settings would not be
problematic if the substantive results were substantially similar. This,
however, is not the case.
A. Imputed Liabilities and the Automatic Nature of the Branch Profits
Tax

Under the branch profits tax, a foreign corporation can be subject
to a second-level tax even when all of its effectively connected E&P is
55
invested in U.S. branch assets. Thus, unlike the application of the
excess interest will be treated as deposit interest and exempt from the tax. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.884-4(a)(2)(iii) (1996). Treaties can apply to reduce the rate of taxation to
the rate applying to interest paid to a foreign corporation by a U.S. corporation, that
rate typically being zero percent. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4(c)(3) (1996); see, e.g.,
MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at art. 11, para. 1. To be entitled to treaty
benefits for purposes of the excess interest tax, a foreign corporation must meet the
requirements of the limitations on benefits provision (if any) contained in the treaty,
and in addition, either the foreign corporation is a qualified resident of the treaty
country within the meaning of section 884(e)(4) and Treas. Reg. § 1.884-5(a), or the
limitations on benefits provision, or an amendment thereto, entered into force after
December 31, 1986. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4(c)(3)(i) (1996).
52 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1037.
53 See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
54 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
5S See Alfred C. Groff & James F. Hoch, Selected Issues in U.S. Taxation of u.s.
Branches of Foreign Banks, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 343, 363; Brown, supra note 4, at
196-97; Institute of International Bankers Comments, supra note 16; International
Commercial Bank of China Comments, supra note 16; Peat Marwick Comments, supra
note 16.
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dividend tax in the case of a U.S. subsidiary, a branch profits tax
liability can occur in the absence of an actual remittance of U.S.
earnings. This is due to the fact that in determining increases and
decreases in U.S. net equity for purposes of the tax, U.S. liabilities are
essentially those that are imputed under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 in the
determination of the interest expense deduction allocated to
effectively connected income,56 as opposed to the actual booked
57
liabilities of the U.S. branch. For example, assume that a foreign
corporation has $1,000,000 of effectively connected E&P for a
58
particular year, and reinvests all of the E&P in U.S. assets. There
are no other changes in the amount of the foreign corporation's U.S
assets for the year. Assume that the foreign corporation detennines
its interest expense deduction under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 by using the
fifty percent fixed liabilities-to-assets ratio to impute liabilities to its
59
U.S. branch. Under these facts, the foreign corporation would have
a dividend equivalent amount of $500,000 for the year, which is equal
to its effectively connected E&P of $1,000,000 reduced by its increase
in U.S. net equity of $500,000 ($1,000,000 increase in U.S. assets less
$500,000 increase in U.S. liabilities).60 Consequently, the foreign
corporation is deemed to have remitted $500,000 of effectively
61
connected E&P despite there being no actual remittances.
See supra note 43.
See Groff & Hoch, supra note 55, at 363; Brown, supra note 4, at 196-97;
Institute of International Bankers Comments, supra note 16; International Commercial
Bank of China Comments, supra note 16; Peat Marwick Comments, supra note 16.
58
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
59 See supra note 43.
60 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. The increase in U.S. liabilities
($500,000) would equal the increase in U.S. assets ($1,000,000) multiplied by the fixed
liability-to-asset ratio (.5).
61 See Blessing, supra note 46, at 602; Musher, supra note 45, at 113 n.9. While
the example in the text involves the use of the fixed liability-to-asset ratio, a similar
result is possible for a foreign corporation using its actual liability-to-asset ratio to
determine its interest deduction allocated to effectively connected income. For
example, where, for a particular year, a foreign corporation's U.S. operations are
relatively more profitable than its foreign operations, and all earnings are retained in
the branch that earned them, the U.S. branch will draw a greater portion of the
foreign corporation's liabilities as compared to the prior year using the actual ratio.
See Peter J. Genz, Planning for Inbound Foreign Investment Under the Final Branch
Tax Regulations - Part I, 22 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 118, 132 (1993); Musher, supra note
45, at 112. As a result, where the foreign corporation's total liabilities remained
unchanged from the prior year, the amount of U.S. liabilities will increase for the
current year, causing a dividend equivalent amount to this extent even if all
effectively connected E&P for the year is invested in U.S. assets.
56

57
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These results are inconsistent with the neutrality policy
underlying the branch profits tax in the sense that a dividend tax
would not be imposed automatically in the absence of an actual
distribution by a U.S. subsidiary.62 However, defining U.S. liabilities
by reference to liabilities imputed under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 is in
accordance with the policy of neutrality. This is because in both the
branch and subsidiary settings, U.S. earnings will be subject to a
second-level tax to the extent that they no longer generate taxable
63
income subject to net basis taxation by the United States. To explain
in terms of the previous example, because of interest deductions on
the additional liabilities of $500,000, only $500,000 of the $1,000,000 in
effectively connected E&P should be viewed as generating income
subject to net basis U.S. taxation in subsequent years. The remaining
$500,000 in effectively connected E&P should be treated as remitted
outside of the U.S. branch given that this amount effectively is outside
the scope of such taxation. This is also the case for a U.S. subsidiary
with $1,000,000 of E&P that first borrowed $500,000 from its foreign
parent and then distributed $500,000 to the parent, in that only
$500,000 of earnings would continue to generate income subject to net
64
basis U.S. taxation.
Of course, there is an important difference in the application of
the second-level taxes in the branch and subsidiary settings: a foreign
corporation with a U.S. branch does not have the same ability to
control the timing of the second-level tax as does a foreign
corporation with a U.S. subsidiary.65 The latter can avoid a current
dividend tax on U.S. earnings by having the U.S. subsidiary retain its
earnings; unlike the treatment of a U.S. branch, liabilities will not be

62 See Brown, supra note 4, at 196-97; Institute of International Bankers
Comments, supra note 16.
63 See Brown, supra note 4, at 197; cf Groff & Hoch, supra note 55, at 363
(stating that it is arguably not unreasonable to impose a cost where a foreign bank has
benefited from the fixed ratio in computing its interest deductions). In this regard,
Congress intended for U.S. net equity to include only those assets and liabilities that
generate income taxable by the United States on a net basis. See 1986 Bluebook,
supra note 9, at 1040.
64 Treasury similarly justifies the use of imputed liabilities on neutrality grounds
by pointing out that if a U.S. business were conducted in a U.S. subsidiary, the
subsidiary's assumption of a portion of the foreign parent's liabilities with no resulting
increase in assets would be treated as a dividend distribution from the subsidiary to
the parent. See Preamble to Temporary and Proposed Regulations under Section
884, reprinted in Service Issues Branch Profits Tax Regulations, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Aug. 30, 1988) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 88 TNT 178-2).
65 See Brown, supra note 4, at 197; Musher, supra note 45, at 112.
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imputed to earnings retained by a U.S. subsidiary. Moreover, there
appears to be little possibility that the accumulated earnings tax would
apply to the retained earnings of the U.S. subsidiary as a surrogate for
a second-level tax, and the personal holding company tax, even if
potentially applicable, should still allow for generous accumulations
without the risk of penalty.66 Thus, the typical U.S. subsidiary
conducting a business should have a good deal of flexibility in
avoiding dividend and corporate penalty taxes by retaining earnings in
either business or nonbusiness assets. In contrast, the branch profits
tax can apply automatically, regardless of how much effectively
connected E&P is invested in U.S. branch assets, as the example
67
above indicates.
Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(3) does provide some relief from the
automatic application of the branch profits tax by allowing for an
election to reduce U.S. liabilities for purposes of both determining
U.S. net equity under the branch profits tax and calculating the U.S.
68
Under
branch's interest deduction under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5.
Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(3), U.S. liabilities cannot be reduced below
69
the amount of U.S. booked liabilities.
Thus, in the previous
For an explanation of the application of the corporate penalty taxes in the
subsidiary setting, see infra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
67 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
68 A reduction in U.S. liabilities for branch profits tax purposes requires a
corresponding reduction in U.S.-connected liabilities for purposes of Treas. Reg.
§ 1.882-5. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(3)(iii) (1996). This in turn can lower a foreign
corporation's excess interest tax liability. See id; supra notes 50-52 and accompanying
text. Treasury's stated purpose for providing the election to reduce liabilities is to
permit a foreign corporation to accumulate earnings in non-U.S. assets for later
capital investment in the U.S. business. See T.D. 8432, 1992-2 C.B. 157, 163. In this
regard, the liability reduction election replaced the expansion capital election
contained in the proposed and temporary regulations. See id.; infra note 240. The
latter was viewed by Treasury as ineffective (because of the possible imputation of
additional U.S. liabilities on elected assets) and complex (if properly drafted) in
permitting accumulations of expansion capital in what would otherwise be non-U.S.
assets. See T.D. 8432, 1992-2 c.B. 157, 163.
69 Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(3)(ii) (1996). Specifically, the floor on reducing U.S.
liabilities is the amount of U.S. booked liabilities as of the determination date
(generally the close of the taxable year), increased by the amount of any liabilities
giving rise to interest expense that is directly allocated to income from a U.S. asset
under Treas. Reg. § 1.861-lOT, as well as by the amount of certain liabilities of foreign
insurance companies that are described in Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(2)(i). See Treas.
Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(3)(ii) (1996). U.S. booked liabilities are generally defined as
liabilities that are treated as properly reflected on the books of the U.S. business
based on certain standards set forth in the regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(d)(2)(i)
(1996). More specifically, for nonbanks, U.S. booked liabilities include liabilities
66
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example, the foreign corporation may be able to reduce its U.S.
liabilities by $500,000, which would result in a dividend equivalent
amount of zero for the particular year (effectively connected E&P of
$1,000,000 reduced by an increase in U.S. net equity of $1,000,000).70
However, the foreign corporation could only do so if its U.S. liabilities
prior to the reduction exceeded its U.S. booked liabilities by at least
the amount of the desired reduction in U.S. liabilities, in this case
$500,000. In addition, the regulations generally provide that to the
extent the foreign corporation does not ultimately make investments
resulting in additional U.S. net equity in an amount equal to the
earnings accumulating as a result of the election, the foreign
corporation must recapture that amount as a dividend equivalent
71
amount in the year that the U.S. branch is completely terminated.
secured by U.S assets of the foreign corporation and liabilities entered on the books
of the foreign corporation's U.S. business at a time that is reasonably
contemporaneous with the time that the liability is incurred, among other liabilities.
Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(d)(2)(ii) (1996). For banks, U.S. booked liabilities include
liabilities that are timely entered on the books of the foreign corporation's U.S.
business, provided the liabilities have a direct connection or relationship to the U.S.
business. Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(d)(2)(iii)(A) (1996).
70 The liability reduction election is effective only for determining U.S. net
equity for the taxable year for which the election is made. See Treas. Reg. § 1.8841(e)(3), (e)(5), ex. 2; Genz, supra note 61, at 133. Therefore, if U.S. assets and U.S.
liabilities otherwise remain constant, a foreign corporation will have to continue to
make the election in succeeding years in order to continue to defer the branch profits
tax. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(5), ex. 2; Genz, supra note 61, at 133. In addition,
because of the corresponding reduction in the amount of U.S.-connected liabilities
and resulting interest deductions, the liability reduction election, while increasing U.S.
net equity, may also increase effectively connected E&P. See Treas. Reg. § 1.8841(e)(5), ex. 2. This may necessitate a further reduction in U.S. liabilities to avoid a
dividend equivalent amount. See id.; Genz, supra note 61, at 133 (explaining that a
foreign corporation may need to use algebra to determine the amount of the liability
reduction needed to avoid any dividend equivalent amount).
71 See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(3)(v) (1996).
Technically, recapture occurs
because of an election to reduce U.s. liabilities for the year preceding the year of the
complete termination. This assumes that the election contributed to the foreign
corporation's accumulated effectively connected E&P that existed at the time of the
complete termination. See id. (upon complete termination of the U.S. branch, the
branch profits tax is imposed on a dividend equivalent amount equal to the lesser of
"(i) the foreign corporation's accumulated effectively connected E&P that is
attributable to the liability reduction election or (ii) the liability reduction that is in
effect for the taxable year preceding the year of the complete termination"). A
subsequent increase in U.S. net equity would allow a foreign corporation to
discontinue its liability reduction election by the amount of the increase, without
generating a dividend equivalent amount for the particular year. Therefore, a foreign
corporation can avoid the recapture rule by increasing its investment in U.S. net
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On the facts of the example given above, this means that the foreign
corporation would eventually need to increase its U.S. net equity by
$500,000, the amount of earnings accumulating as a result of the
liability reduction, in order to avoid recapture. To do so, the foreign
corporation would have to invest an additional $1,000,000 in U.S.
assets because of the additional U.S. liabilities that would result from
additional U.S. assets.72
With these features, the liability reduction election apparently is
not very useful to foreign corporations in controlling the timing of
their branch profits tax liability. With the recapture rule, if the
taxpayer is not able to make the necessary investments to avoid
recapture,73 the benefits of reducing liabilities (the delay in the
imposition of the branch profits tax with a possible reduction in excess
interest tax liability) may well not outweigh its costs (losing the tax
benefit attributable to the forgone interest deductions).74 In part for
equity after making an election to reduce liabilities. It should be pointed out that in
explaining the recapture rule, Treasury states that recapture will occur if the foreign
corporation does not ultimately reinvest the accumulated earnings in additional U.S.
assets, as opposed to additional U.S. equity. See T.D. 8432, 1992-2 c.B. 157, 160. This
statement seems imprecise given the language of the recapture rule, as analyzed
above. For foreign corporations using the fixed liability-to-asset ratio under Treas.
Reg. § 1.882-5, investing amounts in additional U.S. assets will not result in additional
U.S. net equity equal to the invested amounts given that additional U.S. assets will
create additional U.S. liabilities. The same result can occur with the use of the actual
liability-to-asset ratio. See supra note 61.
Aside from the application of the recapture rule, the complete termination of a
U.S. branch generally does not result in the imposition of the branch profits tax. See
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-2T(a) (2006). This is consistent with treating a U.S. branch
as a hypothetical U.S. subsidiary for purposes of the branch profits tax, given that a
foreign parent is usually not subject to U.S. tax with respect to distributions received
upon the liquidation of its U.S. subsidiary. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying
text.
72 $1,000,000 in U.S. assets less $500,000 in U.S. liabilities (fifty percent of
$1,000,000) yields $500,000 in U.S. net equity. See supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
73 In this regard, if taxpayers attempted to avoid recapture by investing in U.S.
assets just prior to a complete termination of the U.S. branch, the Service may be able
to use its authority under Treas. Reg. 1.884-1(d)(5)(ii) to ignore artificial increases in
U.S. assets. See Alan S. Lederman & Bobbe Hirsh, Final Branch Regulations Fail to
Clear the Thicket of Complexity, 78 1. TAX'N 110, 113 (1993).
74 Delaying the branch profits tax would allow a foreign corporation to invest
and earn a return on the amount of the deferred taxes. Consequently, the annual
benefit of delaying the branch profits tax should be equal to the reduction in the
amount of liabilities (which would translate into reduced dividend equivalent
amount), multiplied by (1) the rate of the branch profits tax and (2) the foreign
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this reason/ the election appears to be worthwhile only

In

limited

corporation's after-tax rate of return. In this regard, the rate of the branch profits tax
is normally thirty percent, but could be five percent or less if the foreign corporation
is entitled to treaty benefits. See MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at art. 10,
paras. 2(a), 8, 9. The annual cost of losing the tax benefit attributable to the forgone
interest deductions should be equal to the reduction in the amount of liabilities,
multiplied by (1) the interest rate imputed to U.S. liabilities under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.882-5, and by (2) the marginal federal income tax rate that applies to the foreign
corporation. In addition, the reduction of U.S. liabilities could generate a tax benefit
by reducing excess interest tax liability by an amount equal to thirty percent of the
amount of forgone interest deductions; however, in the case of a foreign bank, the
excess interest tax reduction will be no more than fifteen percent of this amount (see
supra note 51), and if the foreign corporation is entitled to treaty benefits, there
would likely be no excess interest tax liability in any event. See id. Assume that the
foreign corporation's after-tax rate of return equals the interest rate imputed under
Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5, designated as R, the foreign corporation's marginal tax rate is
thirty-five percent, the rates of the branch profits tax and excess interest tax are thirty
percent, and the foreign corporation elects to reduce its U.S. liabilities by an amount
designated as L, which reduces its dividend equivalent amount by the same amount.
In this situation, the annual benefit of the election would be equal to L x .30 x R (due
to deferral of branch profits tax) plus L x .30 x R (reduction of excess interest tax) or
L x .60 x R, which would be greater than the annual cost of the election of L x .35 x R.
However, if the foreign corporation is a bank, the annual benefit of the election
would be equal to L x .30 x R (due to deferral of branch profits tax) plus L x .045 x R
(or less) (reduction of excess interest tax) or Lx .345 x R, which would be slightly less
than the annual cost of L x .35 x R. If pursuant to a treaty the foreign corporation is
entitled to a branch profits tax rate of five percent and an excess interest tax rate of
zero, the annual benefit of the liability reduction election (L x .05 x R) would be
substantially less than the annual cost (L x .35 x R). Indeed, the latter two situations
may well be the typical situations where the liability reduction election is available.
This is because the election can only be used where U.S. liabilities exceed U.S.
booked liabilities, and foreign corporations other than banks or treaty beneficiaries
may take steps to increase their U.S. booked liabilities, see supra note 69, to avoid
excess interest tax exposure. Cf Peter J. Connors, 909-3rd T.M. (BNA), The BranchRelated Taxes of Section 884 A-51 (pointing out that foreign corporations may seek to
maximize branch interest and thereby lower excess interest by "overbooking"
liabilities to the U.S. branch until the amount of the interest deduction is known).
Nevertheless, commentators do note the use of the liability reduction election to
reduce excess interest tax exposure, see infra notes 76-77, indicating that foreign
corporations with such exposure do find themselves in excess U.S. liability situations
This analysis ignores any foreign and state tax consequences of making the
election, which could be a factor. Also, it should be emphasized that this costlbenefit
analysis assumes that the foreign corporation would not be able to make the required
investments in U.S assets to avoid recapture.
75 Even without the recapture rule, a foreign corporation may not want to forgo
interest deductions in exchange for reducing its branch profits tax liability, especially
if the foreign corporation is entitled to reduced branch profits tax rate and an
exemption from the excess interest tax pursuant to a treaty. This is similar to a

1236

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 25:1219

circumstances,76 such as where the U.S. branch is operating at a loss
for the taxable year,77 or where the foreign corporation has current
78
effectively connected E&P but an accumulated deficit. Importantly,
the usefulness of the liability reduction election is curtailed further by
the U.S. booked liability limit on reducing U.S. liabilities. Indeed,
because of this limitation, the election very likely would be
unavailable for a foreign corporation whose liabilities consist entirely

foreign corporation with a U.S. subsidiary that chooses to distribute earnings and
incur a dividend tax rather than having income generated by the invested earnings
subject to net basis taxation by the United States. Cf Cynthia Blum, How the United
States Should Tax Foreign Shareholders, 7 VA. TAX REV. 583, 662-66 (1988)
(discussing the tax tradeoffs facing a U.S. subsidiary in deciding whether to
accumulate or distribute earnings).
76 In this regard, one commentator states that the election to reduce liabilities
will be most useful for purposes of reducing the excess interest tax contained in
section 884(f). See Kathleen Matthews, Canada-Netherlands Protocol Discussion
Highlights Annual U.S. IFA Branch Meeting, 93 TAX NOTES INT'L 49-4 (1993)
(pointing out that for companies operating at a loss, the resulting reduction in
deductible interest expense will lower their excess interest tax liability while not
affecting regular income tax liability because of the net loss situation). Another
commentator states that in the absence of treaty protection from the branch profits
tax, the election usually makes sense for foreign banks. See Yaron Z. Reich, U.S.
Federal Income Taxation of u.s. Branches of Foreign Banks: Selected Issues and
Perspectives, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 1,65 n.159 (1994). Nevertheless, Reich may not be
taking into account the effect of the recapture rule (at least it is not mentioned in his
example).
77 See Paul C. Lau & Rolf Auster, Structuring U.S. Operations for Foreign
Corporations in the Current Tax Climate, 27 J. CORP. TAX'N 34, 41 (2000); Connors,
supra note 74, A-15 to -16 (noting that the election may be attractive to a foreign
corporation with losses that is otherwise facing an excess interest tax liability); Genz,
supra note 61, at 133.
78 The liability reduction election should be beneficial in the latter situation
because the recapture rule provides that the dividend equivalent amount upon the
complete termination of the U.S. branch will not exceed the accumulated effectively
connected E&P that is attributable to the election to reduce liabilities. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(3)(v) (1996). Consequently, if the foreign corporation has a deficit
in effectively connected E&P when it completely terminates its U.S. branch, there will
be no recapture of previously reduced liabilities.
Alternatively, in these
circumstances, the taxpayer can discontinue the election for a subsequent year in
which there is both negative current and accumulated effectively connected E&P,
without incurring a current branch profits tax in that particular year, or a recapture
tax upon termination because of the liability reduction limit on recapture. See id.
Thus, the election also allows a foreign corporation to avoid the tax where it would
otherwise be imposed in a manner similar to the "nimble dividend" rule of section
316(a)(2). LR.C. § 316(a)(2).
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79

of U.S. booked liabilities.
More fundamentally, as demonstrated
below, a U.S. subsidiary would not face the potential for a recapture
tax following a reduction of its liabilities, nor would it be so limited in
80
its ability to reduce liabilities.
B. Greater Flexibility of u.s. Subsidiaries in Retaining Earnings
In addition to the effects of using imputed liabilities in the branch
setting, a U.S. subsidiary has more control over the timing of the
dividend tax because of its greater flexibility in retaining earnings than
does a U.S. branch. The dividend tax in the U.S. subsidiary setting
81
only applies when earnings are distributed to the foreign parent.
Consequently, a foreign parent of a U.S. subsidiary would avoid a
dividend tax on any earnings of the subsidiary that are invested in
assets of the subsidiary, whether or not the assets are related to the
subsidiary's U.S. business activities; this would include earnings that
82
are invested in foreign business assets and portfolio investments.
There appears to be little possibility that a U.S. subsidiary would
be forced to make distributions in order to avoid application of the
83
accumulated earnings tax for retaining earnings. In most cases, the
accumulated earning tax apparently cannot apply to a wholly owned
U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation, regardless of whether the
subsidiary accumulates earnings beyond the reasonable needs of its
84
business. For the accumulated earnings tax to be applicable, Treas.
Reg. § 1.532-1(a)(1) requires a purpose to avoid the imposition of the
individual income tax on a corporation's shareholders, or shareholders

79 See Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 73, at 113; Genz, supra note 61, at 126-27,
133. For this reason, one commentator describes the liability reduction election as a
poor replacement for the former expansion capital election, and that a properlydesigned expansion capital election would have been much more useful. Genz, supra
note 61, at 126, 133.
80 See infra Parts IV.B.1, IV.C.l.
81 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
82 See Blum, supra note 75, at 614.
83 See 1.R.c. §§ 531-537.
In general, the accumulated earnings tax imposes a
fifteen percent tax on a corporation's accumulated taxable income if the corporation
accumulates earnings for the purpose of avoiding the income tax on its shareholders.
See 1.R.c. §§ 531, 532.
84 Section 533(a) presumes that a corporation accumulates earnings for the
purpose of avoiding the income tax on its shareholders when the corporation
accumulates earnings beyond the reasonable needs of its business. See 1.R.c.
§ 533(a). The corporation can rebut the presumption by proving the contrary by the
preponderance of the evidence. See id.
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of another corporation, by allowing earnings to accumulate instead of
85
distributing them. With respect to a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of
a foreign corporation, this purpose can potentially exist only where
the foreign parent has individual shareholders who would be subject
86
to U.S. tax on dividends paid by the parent.
With a few minor
exceptions, a foreign shareholder is not taxable with respect to
87
dividends paid by a foreign corporation.
Consequently, for the
accumulated earnings tax to apply even potentially in the U.S.
subsidiary setting, the foreign parent would very likely need to have
88
U.S. individual shareholders. However, because of the possibility of
three levels of U.S. tax, U.S. individuals typically would not want to
See Treas. Reg. § 1.532-1(a)(1) (1960).
See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-09-034 (Feb. 28, 1997); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
94-22-028 (June 3, 1994).
87 See 1.R.c. § 871(i)(2)(D).
Section 871(i)(2)(D), which was added in 2004,
only provides an exemption from the FDAP/withholding tax for dividends paid by a
foreign corporation that are treated as U.S. source under section 861(a)(2)(B) (which
deals with dividends paid by foreign corporations having at least twenty-five percent
of its gross income being effectively connected gross income over the previous three
years); therefore, in the absence of a treaty exemption, the withholding tax should
continue to apply to other situations where dividends paid by foreign corporation are
treated as U.S. source, that is, dividends paid out of E&P inherited from U.S.
corporations. See 1.R.c. § 861(a)(2)(C). There is also the possibility that U.S. source
(or even foreign source) dividends paid by a foreign corporation to a foreign
individual shareholder could be taxable as effectively connected income; however,
this is quite unlikely given the limitations on effectively connecting stock, even if the
foreign individual shareholder has a U.S. business. See infra note 116 and
accompanying text. See generally I.R.C. § 864(c)(2), (c)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)
(2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-6(b)(2)(ii) (1972).
88 In several private letter rulings, the Service concluded that there was no
potential for the application of the accumulated earnings tax to a U.S. corporation
owned by foreign corporations that neither have U.S. shareholders nor U.S.
businesses. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-09-034 (Feb. 28, 1997); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
94-22-028 (June 3, 1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-30-010 (July 30, 1993); I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 93-30-011 (July 30, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-29-025 (July 17, 1992).
With the enactment in 2004 of section 871(i)(2)(D), see supra note 87, it is less
relevant for these purposes whether the foreign corporation has a U.S. business.
Prior to this exemption, the existence of a U.S. business was quite relevant, as such
could result in the dividends from the foreign corporation being treated as U.S. source
and thus taxable in the hands of a foreign individual shareholder under the
FDAP/withholding tax. With the enactment of section 871(i)(2)(D), whether the
foreign parent conducts a U.S. business is only relevant for purposes of determining
the source of the dividends in applying the rules for determining effectively connected
income; regardless of the source of the dividend income, it is very unlikely that
dividends would be taxable as effectively connected income in the hands of foreign
individual shareholders of the foreign parent. See supra note 87.
85

86
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own stock in a privately-held foreign corporation that in turn has a
U.S. subsidiary.89 A widely-held foreign corporation may well have
some U.S. individual shareholders, either direct or indirect. However,
while possible,90 it appears quite unlikely that a subsidiary of a widelyheld parent would be found to be formed or availed of to avoid the
91
individual tax on the parent's shareholders. This should especially
be the case for a U.S. subsidiary of a widely-held foreign corporation,
whose majority of shareholders would presumably be foreign persons
who rarely would be taxable on dividends paid by the foreign
92
corporation. It seems very unlikely that such a U.S. subsidiary would
be found to accumulate earnings in order to avoid the individual tax
on the foreign parent's U.S. shareholders, where U.S. persons only
93
constitute a minority of the parent's shareholders. Thus, most U.S.
subsidiaries of foreign corporations would appear to be able to retain
earnings without the limitations imposed pursuant to the accumulated
earnings tax.

89 See Fred B. Brown, Wither FIRPTA?, 57 TAX LAW. 295, 325 (2004); cf Genz,
supra note 61, at 137 (pointing out that it will often be the case that dividends paid by
a foreign parent of a U.S. subsidiary to its individual shareholders will not be taxable
by the United States, thus implying that the shareholders typically will not be U.S.
persons).
90 See I.R.C. § 532(c) (stating that accumulated earnings tax is applied without
regard to the number of shareholders).
91 Professors Bittker and Eustice point out that although section 532(c) allows
for the application of the accumulated earnings tax to a publicly-held corporation, the
conferees recommending this provision removed most of its bite by stating that
practically "it may be difficult to establish [a tax avoidance] purpose in the case of a
widely-held operating company when no individual or small group of individuals has
legal or effective control of the company." See BORIS I. BITIKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 7-7 (7th ed.
2000) (quoting from H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 829 (1984), reprinted in 1984-3 e.B.
(Vol. 2) 84); cf Technalysis Corp. v. Commissioner, 101 T.e. 397,410 (1993) (finding
that the proscribed purpose did not exist despite earnings being accumulated beyond
reasonable business needs, because the accumulation was not for the direct benefit of
the shareholders).
92 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
93 That is, even if the U.S. subsidiary accumulates earnings beyond its
reasonable business needs and the presumption of the proscribed purpose attaches,
the subsidiary would appear to be able to demonstrate that its directors did not
accumulate earnings with the intent to avoid the income tax on a minority of its
foreign parent's shareholders. Cf Technalysis Corp. 101 T.e. at 410 (examining the
intent of the board of directors in determining whether a publicly-held corporation
possessed the proscribed purpose, and finding to the contrary even though the
corporation accumulated earnings beyond its reasonable business needs).
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There is also the possibility that a U.S. subsidiary could face
liability under the personal holding company tax for retaining
94
excessive amounts of earnings. For the personal holding company
tax to apply, the U.S. subsidiary must meet a stock ownership test and
an income test. The stock ownership test would be satisfied if more
than fifty percent in value of the U.S. subsidiary's stock is owned by
five or fewer individuals at any time during last half of the taxable
95
year. For purposes of determining stock ownership, attribution rules
apply, so that the ownership test is applied to a U.S. subsidiary by
96
looking to the ultimate individual owners of the foreign parent. The
income test would be met for a taxable year if at least sixty percent of
the corporation's adjusted ordinary gross income consists of personal
holding company income, which is generally investment income
(including dividends, interest, certain royalties, and certain rents ).97
Because of the large proportion of investment income that is
necessary to trigger the application of the tax, significant
accumulations in the case of an operating company should be possible
without the risk of penalty, even if the U.S. subsidiary cannot avoid
98
satisfying the stock ownership test.
As a result of these rules, a typical U.S. subsidiary would appear
to be able to accumulate a generous amount of earnings in
nonbusiness assets and avoid both the dividend tax and the corporate
penalty taxes for retaining earnings. On the other hand, a foreign
corporation with a U.S. branch can avoid a branch profits tax on its
U.S. branch earnings only to the extent that its U.S. net equity is
99
oo
increased. Apart from the liability reduction election/ this would
94 See 1.R.c. §§ 541-547.
Section 541 imposes a fifteen percent tax on the
undistributed personal holding company income of a personal holding company (as
defined in section 542). See I.R.C. § 541. Several types of corporations are excluded
from the application of the personal holding company tax, including foreign
corporations and banks. See 1.R.c. § 542(c).
95 See 1.R.c. § 542(a)(2).
% See 1.R.c. § 544(a).
97 See 1.R.c. §§ 542(a)(1), 543(b)(2), 543(a).
98 Cf BITIKER & EUSTICE, supra note 91, at 7-61 (suggesting an increase in the
number of shareholders coupled with an avoidance of the stock attribution rules to
avoid the personal holding company tax). However, corporations that meet the
closely held test are cautioned to monitor their accumulation of earnings in
investment assets. See Genz, supra note 61, at 138.
99 See supra notes 3~3 and accompanying text. This assumes that the foreign
corporation is not exempt from the application of section 884 by virtue of an income
tax treaty. See supra note 36.
100 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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require that the foreign corporation invest its U.S. earnings in U.S.
assets, that is, assets that generally produce effectively connected
income.101 This usually means that the assets must bear some
connection to the business conducted by the U.S. branch. 102 More
specifically, U.S. assets include assets employed in U.S. business
operations, such as real estate,I03 depreciable or amortizable personal
•
105 mcome-pro
.
d ucmg
. U .,
S reaI property t hat IS
.
property, 104 mventory,
elected for effectively connected treatment,l06 as well as financial
assets (such as bank deposits and marketable securities) that produce
I07
effectively connected income.
101 See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d) (1996).
The regulations generally define U.S.
assets as property held by the foreign corporation on the determination date
(generally the close of taxable year), if all of the property's income and gain on that
date is effectively connected income, or would be effectively connected if the property
produced income and gain on that date. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(1)(i) (1996). In
addition, the regulations employ effectively connected income rules and concepts to
specify categories of property that qualify as U.S. assets regardless of the general rule.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(2) -(4) (1996).
102 See generally 1.R.c. § 864(c); infra notes 103-38 and accompanying text. See
also Mark Alan Masek, United States Business: United States Branch Versus United
States Corporation, 23 INT'L LAW. 137 (1989).
103 U.S. real estate used in U.S. business operations should qualify as a U.S. asset
under the general rule contained in Treas. Reg. 1.884-1(d)(1)(i). See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.884-1(d)(2)(xi), ex. 2 (1996).
104 All or a portion of depreciable or amortizable personal property used in U.S.
business operations should qualify as a U.S. asset under a specific category rule. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(2)(i) (1996).
105 All or a portion of inventory used in U.S. business operations should qualify
as a U.S. asset under a specific category rule. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(2)(ii)
(1996).
106 Where a foreign corporation has made an election under section 882(d) to
treat income from U.S. real property as effectively connected, the property should
qualify as a U.S. asset under the general rule contained in Treas. Reg. 1.884l(d)(l)(i). Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(2)(xi), ex. 3 (1996) (where a foreign
corporation had not made an election under section 882(d), U.S. real property not
connected to a U.S. business did not qualify as a U.S. asset).
107 Specifically, financial assets would qualify as U.S. assets under the general
rule if they meet the effectively connected income and gain standard contained
therein. See supra note 101. In addition, certain categories of financial assets can
qualify as U.S. assets under the specific category rules. An interest-bearing deposit
with a bank or similar entity (e.g., savings and loans) would qualify as a U.S. asset if
all of the income from the deposit during the year is effectively connected; a
noninterest bearing deposit would qualify as a U.S. asset if the deposit is needed in
the U.S. business under the asset-use test without regard to the presumption rule. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(2)(v) (1996); infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text. A
debt instrument not covered under any other specific rule, such as a marketable
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For U.S. source income from financial assets to be effectively
connected, either (i) the activities of the U.S. branch must be a
material factor in the realization of the income,109 in the case of
income arising directly from U.S. branch activities,110 or (ii) the
financial assets are used or held for use in the conduct of the U.S.
branch's business,lIl in the case of income arising indirectly from U.S.
branch activities.1I2 The latter standard (referred to in the regulations
as the "asset-use test") is satisfied if the asset is (a) "held for the
principal purpose of promoting the present conduct" of the U.S.
branch's business, (b) "acquired and held in the ordinary course of the
[U.S.] trade or business," or (c) "otherwise held in a direct
relationship" to that business.1l3 In determining whether an asset is
held in a direct relationship to the U.S. business, a principal factor is
whether the asset is needed in that business, which requires that the
asset be held to meet the present needs of the U.S. business and not
114
its anticipated future needs.
In addition, an asset will be presumed
to be held in a direct relationship to the U.S. business if (i) the asset
was acquired with funds generated by that business, (ii) the income

security held by a nonbank, would qualify as a U.S. asset if (i) all of the income from
the instrument for the taxable year is effectively connected and (ii) the yield on the
instrument while it is held during the taxable year equals or exceeds the Applicable
Federal Rate for obligations of similar type and maturity. See Treas. Reg. § 1.8841( d)(2)(vi) (1996). Certain investment securities held by banks are treated as U.S.
assets in proportion to the amount of their income that is treated as effectively
connected for the taxable year. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(2)(vii) (1996); infra note
120 and accompanying text.
108 Specifically, this refers to assets generating U.S. source FDAP income (e.g.,
interest, dividends, rents and royalties) and capital gains. See I.R.C. §§ 864(c)(2),
871(a)(I), (h), 881(a), (c).
109 See 1.R.c. § 864(c)(2)(B).
110 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(3), (c)(5) (2005). The regulations implementing
this standard contain the business-activities test and the special banking rules. See id.
III
See 1.R.c. § 864(c)(2)(A). In making the determinations under section
864(c)(2), due regard is given to whether or not the asset or income is carried on
books of account kept for the U.S. business. See 1.R.c. § 864(c)(2); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.864-4( c)( 4) (2005) (accounting test is not by itself controlling).
112 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2) (2005).
Foreign source FDAP income
generally cannot be effectively connected. See 1.R.c. § 864(c)(4). One exception is
where a U.S. banking branch derives interest or dividends on stocks or securities with
respect to which the U.S. branch satisfies certain participation standards, among other
requirements. See I.R.C. § 864(c)(4)(B)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-6(b)(2)(ii)(b) (1972);
Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5) (2005).
113 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(ii) (2005).
114 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iv)(a) (2005).
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from the asset is reinvested or retained in that business, and (iii) U.S.
branch personnel significantly manage and control the investment of
IIS
the asset.
Generally, dividends and gain on stock cannot be
116
effectively connected income under the asset-use test.
Special rules apply to determine the effectively connected status
of interest, dividends, and capital gains from securities or stocks
ll7
derived by U.S. banking branches of foreign persons. Such banking
income generally will be effectively connected if the U.S. banking
branch actively and materially participated in soliciting, negotiating,
or performing other activities necessary to arrange the acquisition of
1I8
the security or stock.
However, under these special banking rules,
notwithstanding such participation, it would appear that income from
stock usually cannot be effectively connected,1I9 and income on certain
investment securities cannot be effectively connected to the extent
that the aggregate of such securities exceeds ten percent of the assets
120
of the U.S. branch.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iv)(b) (2005).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iii)(a) (2005). An exception applies for stock
held by a foreign insurance company, unless the foreign insurance company owns ten
percent or more of the vote or value of the stock in the particular corporation. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iii)(b) (2005).
117 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5) (2005).
118 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(ii), (iii) (2005).
119 This is a result of the requirement that stock be acquired (i) as a result of, or
in the course of, making loans to the public, which excludes purchases on exchanges
or over-the-counter markets, (ii) in the course of distributing stocks or securities to
the public, or (iii) to satisfy reserve requirements established by banking authorities in
the United States. See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(ii), (iv)(c) (2005). Compare Treas.
Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(vii), ex. 2 (2005) (dividends and gain on stock treated as not
effectively connected where stock purchased on exchange and not acquired to meet
reserve requirements) with Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(vii), ex. 3 (2005) (dividends
and gain on stock treated as effectively connected where stock received as
consideration for making a loan).
120 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(ii) (2005).
Specifically, securities that are
covered by this rule are securities other than the following: (i) securities acquired (a)
as a result of, or in the course of, making loans to the public, which excludes
purchases on exchanges or over-the-counter markets, (b) in the course of distributing
stocks or securities to the public, or (c) to satisfy reserve requirements established by
banking authorities in the United States, or (ii) securities that (a) are payable on
demand or at a fixed date one year or less from the acquisition date, or (b) issued by
the United States government. See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(ii)(b)(3) (2005). An
example of a security that would typically fall within this investment securities
limitation would be a corporate bond, with a maturity date more than a year after the
acquisition date, which is acquired on an exchange or organized over-the-counter
market.
115

116
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As a result of the rules for defining U.S. assets, a U.S. branch
could be subject to a second-level tax where it invests its earnings in
assets unrelated to its U.S. business, even though there would be no
dividend tax (or likely corporate penalty taxes) in a similar situation
involving a U.S. subsidiary.l2l For example, the dividend tax obviously
would not apply where a U.S. subsidiary, conducting a U.S. business
that sells inventory, invests its earnings in U.S. corporate bonds, and
neither the accumulated earnings tax nor the personal holding
l22
In contrast, a foreign
company tax would typically apply as well.
corporation with a U.S. sales branch may well face a branch profits tax
liability in this situation (apart from the imputation of U.S. liabilities
123
on additional U.S. assets ). For the branch profits tax not to apply,
the U.S. corporate bonds would need to qualify as U.S. assets, which,
in turn, would require that interest on the bonds constitute effectively
l24
connected income.
Because the business activities of the U.S.
branch do not give rise directly to the realization of the interest, the
asset-use test should be used to determine the effectively connected
l25
status of the income. Under this test, the interest income would be
effectively connected if the bonds were held to meet the present needs
of the U.S. business, such as if the bonds constituted a temporary
126
On the other hand, the bonds
investment of working capital.
ordinarily would not satisfy the asset-use test if they were held for
future diversification into a new business, expansion of non-U.S.
business activities, future business contingencies, or future plant
127
replacement.

121 See Masek, supra note 102, at 144--45; cf Musher, supra note 45, at 112-13
(pointing out that, under the assumption that the accumulated earnings tax would be
potentially applicable to a comparable U.S. subsidiary, a U.S. branch apparently
could not accumulate earnings in assets held for anticipated future business needs and
avoid the branch profits tax, whereas a similarly situated subsidiary could do so and
avoid the dividend tax as well as the accumulated earnings tax).
122 See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
124 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. This assumes that the interest on
the bonds equals or exceeds the Applicable Federal Rate for debt instruments with
similar terms. See id.
125 See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text. In this regard, the regulations
provide that the asset-use test is of primary significance where U.S. source interest
income is derived by a foreign corporation that is engaged in the business of selling
goods or manufacturing in the United States. See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(i)
(2005).
126 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iv)(a), (c)(2)(v), ex. 1 (2005).
127 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iv)(a) (2005).
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Nevertheless, the interest on the bonds may be effectively
connected under the rule that presumes a direct relationship between
the asset and the U.S business, if the interest is reinvested or retained
in the U.S. business and U.S. branch personnel significantly manage
128
and control the investment in the bonds.
In this regard, it is not
clear what constitutes reinvesting or retaining income in the U.S.
business; while using the funds in the business activity of the U.S.
branch should qualify,129 retaining funds in an account or investment
l30
maintained by U.S. branch personnel may not.
Perhaps more
significant is the uncertainty concerning the effect of the presumption.
The regulations indicate that the taxpayer can overcome the
presumption of a direct relationship by showing that the asset was
131
It is unclear
held for future purposes relating to the U.S. business.
whether the Internal Revenue Service (Service) likewise can
overcome the presumption by demonstrating such a purpose, and
whether a party attempting to rebut the presumption needs to satisfy a
132
It may be that the
higher than normal burden in order to prevail.
presumption merely shifts to the party opposed to effectively
connected treatment the burden of showing that the asset was not held
to meet the present needs of the U.S. business. If so, even if the
presumption applies in the case of the bonds, the Service could still
prevail in treating the bonds as non-U.S. assets by showing that they
are held for purposes unrelated to the present needs of the U.S.

128 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
The third requirement for the
application of the presumption, that the asset was acquired with funds generated by
the u.s. business, is satisfied under the assumed facts. See supra text accompanying
note 122-23.
129 This should include using income from the asset as working capital for the
U.S. business, or to acquire property for use or sale in the U.S. business.
130 An example in the regulations applying the presumption simply states that
income from an asset is retained in the U.S. business without elaborating on the
details. See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(v), ex. 2 (2005). Providing more detail, the
House technical explanation of section 864(c)(2) states that the "significance to be
attached to the disposition of the income [from an asset] will depend on the amount
of such income and its relation to other activities of the U.S. business." See H.R. REP.
No. 1450, 89TH CONG., 20 SESS., at 59 (1966), reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 967, 1008. This
statement indicates that simply retaining the income in an account maintained by the
U.S. branch may not be sufficient to satisfy the presumption.
131 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(v), ex. 2 (2005).
132 The regulations are silent in this regard. The proposed regulations under this
section required a "clear showing" that the asset was not held to meet the present
needs of the U.S. business in order to rebut the presumption. See Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.864-4(c)(2)(iii)(b), 34 Fed. Reg. 1030, 1032 (Jan. 23, 1969).
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business. 133
If the example above involved a U.S. branch engaged in banking,
neither the asset-use test (with its presumption rule) nor the business
134
activities test would govern the effectively connected status of the
interest on the bonds. Instead, the special banking rules would apply,
and under these rules, the bonds generally would qualify as U.S. assets
(because the interest income would be effectively connected) if the
U.S. branch actively and materially participated in the acquisition of
the bonds.13s However, assuming that the bonds were purchased on
exchanges (or organized over-the-counter markets) and had terms in
excess of one year from the date of acquisition, the bonds likely would
not qualify as U.S. assets to the extent that the aggregate of the bonds
and similar securities held by the U.S. branch exceed ten percent of
136
the assets of the U.S. branch.
As a result of the investment
securities limitation, a U.S. banking branch would not have the same
flexibility in retaining earnings as would a U.S. banking subsidiary,
which could retain an unlimited amount of earnings in debt
instruments of any type, including long-term corporate bonds and
municipal government bonds (subject to possible constraints under
137
the accumulated earnings tax ). Nevertheless, a U.S. banking branch
would appear to have a good deal of flexibility, given that it can retain
earnings in U.S. government obligations and corporate bonds with
maturity dates of one year or less from acquisition, without limitation
under the investment securities rule.138 In addition, a U.S. banking
branch could retain earnings in other investment securities up to the

133 On the other hand, the Service appears to indicate in a field service advice
that it cannot rebut the presumption, characterizing the presumption rule as a safe
harbor, which, if met by the taxpayer, will satisfy the direct relationship standard
without a showing of actual need. See 1996 FSA LEXIS 273 (Jan. 30, 1996). The field
service advice does not expressly discuss whether or not the Service could rebut a
determination of direct relationship pursuant to the presumption rule. The legislative
history of section 864(c), which gave rise to the presumption rule, does not appear to
resolve the uncertainty. See H.R. REP. No. 1450, supra note 130, at 1008 ("Generally,
the presence of [the three presumption] factors is to be determinative of the assets
being used in the business without showing that the income or assets are needed in
the U.S. business.").
134 See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
137 In this regard, the accumulated earnings tax likely would not be even
potentially applicable to most U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations. See supra
notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
138 See supra note 120.
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ten percent limit.
Even if foreign corporations with U.S. branches can use the assetuse test and the special banking rules to retain earnings in assets that
are held for some investment or future business purposes, an
important difference still exists between the branch and subsidiary
settings: unlike a similarly situated U.S. subsidiary, a U.S. branch
would lack certainty that the earnings will be treated as retained.
While a U.S. subsidiary can retain earnings with near-certainty of
avoiding a second-level tax simply by investing the earnings in assets
owned by the subsidiary (with possible constraints under the personal
140
holding company139 and accumulated earnings taxes ), a U.S. branch
would need to satisfy the fact-specific standards under the effectively
connected tests in order to increase (or maintain) its amount of U.S.
assets.141 Consequently, a foreign corporation may inadvertently
trigger a branch profits tax liability by making investments that do not
qualify as U.S. assets,142 whereas a U.S. subsidiary should be able to
control the imposition of second-level taxes with relative ease (subject
to any constraints imposed by the corporate penalty taxes).143 This
difference may well add administrative costs to a U.S. branch, which
must take the time and effort to ensure that it satisfies the proper
l44
standards to avoid a second-level tax.
See supra note 94-98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 101-38 and accompanying text.
Even with the apparent
flexibility that U.S. banking branches have in retaining earnings, they still need to
ensure that acquisitions of securities and stocks satisfy the active and material
participation standard in order to have the assets qualify as U.S. assets. See supra
notes 117-20 and accompanying text. In this regard, the Service has indicated that it
will closely scrutinize situations where a foreign bank makes a loan to a related party.
See Rev. Rul. 86-154, 1986-2 C.B. 103, 104 (situation 2). It is also possible for certain
lending activities by a U.S. branch to give rise to securities subject to the investment
securities limitation. For example, where a U.S. branch participates in a syndicated
loan that is managed by another bank, if the U.S. branch acquires its participation
interest after the initial funding of the loan, the interest would apparently fall within
the investment securities limitation. See Reich, supra note 76, at 11-12. It is even
possible for a related party loan involving material participation by the U.S. branch to
be treated as a security not acquired in the course of making loans to the public, and
therefore subject to the investment securities limitation. See id. at 12 n.25.
142 See Genz, supra note 61, at 135.
143 See id.
139
140

144 Cf William H. Newton III, Structuring Foreign Investment in United States
Real Estate, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 517,524-25 (1996) (pointing out that avoiding the
branch profits tax requires continuous monitoring of U.S. assets and liabilities,
whereas avoiding the dividend tax only requires not making distributions).
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C. Resulting Differences in the Imposition of Second-Level Taxes
Importantly, the ability on the part of a U.S. subsidiary to control
the timing of the second-level tax goes beyond determining when the
tax applies;145 it can also affect whether a second-level tax is imposed.
The repatriation of earnings upon the liquidation of a U.S. subsidiary
of a foreign corporation is generally free of U.S. tax to the foreign
146
Moreover, as discussed above, a U.S. subsidiary typically
parent.
145

Of course, timing in itself can be important in light of the time value of

money.
146 It appears that section 332 generally would provide tax-free treatment to a
foreign parent upon the liquidation of its U.S. subsidiary. Under section 332, a parent
corporation generally will not recognize gain or loss upon the receipt of property in
the complete liquidation of its subsidiary corporation provided that the parent owns
at least eighty percent of the stock of the subsidiary (by vote and value) and the
liquidation meets certain timing requirements. See I.R.c. § 332(a), (b). Section
367(a) generally provides that section 332 will not apply to the liquidation by a U.S.
subsidiary into a foreign corporation. See I.R.c. § 367(a)(1). However, regulations
under section 367(e)(2) make section 367(a) inapplicable to these outbound section
332 liquidations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(e)-2(a)(2) (2003); I.R.c. § 367(a)(6)
(providing Treasury with the authority to exclude certain transfers from the
application of section 367(a)(1». Despite this clear statement of section 367(a)'s
nonapplicability to outbound section 332 liquidations, there may be some question as
to whether this statement applies for purposes of the foreign parent's tax treatment,
given that the section 367(e) regulations are directed at the tax treatment of the
liquidating subsidiary. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.367(e)-2(a)(1) (2003) (describing the
purpose and scope of the section 367(e)(2) regulations). In the case of an outbound
section 332 liquidation of a U.S. real property holding corporation (as defined in
section 897( c)(2», regulations under section 897( e) provide that the foreign parent
will not recognize any gain under section 367(a) (or section 897(e». See Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.897-5T(b)(3)(iv)(A) (2003). Even if nonrecognition treatment would be
unavailable under section 332 because of section 367(a), it is very likely that the
foreign parent would still not be subject to tax on the recognized gain under sections
881 or 882. This is because the stock gains would not be FDAP income and therefore
not subject to tax under section 881(a). See I.R.c. § 331(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.14412(b)(1), (2) (2000). And, pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c), the stock gains would
very likely not be effectively connected income and therefore not taxable under
section 882(a). See supra note 116.
As an exception to this tax-free treatment, pursuant to recently added section
332(d), the liquidation of certain domestic holding companies can result in deemed
dividends, which would generally be taxable to the foreign parent under section
881(a). More specifically, section 332(d) treats the liquidation of a U.S. corporation,
substantially all of whose assets consist of stock of affiliated subsidiaries (under
section 1504(a», as a section 301 distribution to the foreign parent, if the liquidating
U.S. corporation had been in existence for less than five years. As a result, the
distribution would be treated as a dividend to the extent of the U.S. holding
company's E&P, see I.R.c. §§ 301(c), 316(a), and thus subject to the thirty percent
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would not be subject to the corporate penalty taxes for retaining
147
earnings. As a result, earnings retained by a U.S. subsidiary may
never be subject to a second-level tax. The complete termination of a
foreign corporation's U.S. branch generally is also tax_free,148 in order
to mirror the tax treatment of a liquidating U.S. subsidiary.149
gross basis tax in the absence of treaty rate reduction. See 1.R.c. § 881(a). Congress
enacted the provision out of a concern that foreign corporations would establish a
U.S. holding corporation to receive tax-free dividends from U.S. operating
companies, liquidate the U.S. holding company to distribute the U.S. earnings without
a dividend tax, and then reestablish another U.S. holding company. See S. REP. No.
108-192, at 166 (2003). Thus, the provision limits the ability of foreign corporations
with U.S. subsidiaries to avoid a dividend tax on U.S. earnings that are removed from
the scope of net basis U.S. taxation prior to the cessation of U.S. operations. In this
regard, see infra note 157-60 and accompanying text. The rules governing the
complete termination of a foreign corporation's U.S. branch contain a similar
restriction, in that the exemption from the branch profits tax for the year of
termination is lost if, within three years after the termination, the foreign corporation
has effectively connected income (with some exceptions) or the U.S. assets of the
terminated branch (or property attributable to such U.S. assets or to effectively
connected E&P of the termination year) are used by the foreign corporation or a
related corporation in a U.S. business. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-2T(a)(2) (1996);
infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text; cf S. REP. No. 108-192, at 165-66 (2003)
(referring to this branch termination rule in describing the present law in connection
with proposal to add section 332(d».
While the liquidation of a U.S. subsidiary generally is tax-free to the foreign
parent, the U.S. subsidiary would generally be required to recognize any gain realized
on the transaction. See infra note 149.
147 See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
148 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-2T(a)(1) (1996).
A foreign corporation
generally is not subject to the branch profits tax for the year in which it completely
terminates its U.S. business activities. See id. The recapture tax is an exception to
this complete termination rule. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. In general,
a foreign corporation is treated as having completely terminated all of its U.S.
business activities if (i) the foreign corporation has no U.S. assets; (ii) for the next
three years, the foreign corporation has no effectively connected income (with some
exceptions), and the U.S. assets of the terminated branch (as well as property
attributable to such U.S. assets or to effectively connected E&P of the termination
year) are not used by the foreign corporation or a related corporation in a U.S.
business; and (iii) the foreign corporation satisfies certain procedural requirements.
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-2T(a)(2) (1996).
149 See Feingold & Berg, supra note 46, at 223-26. Upon the liquidation of a U.S.
subsidiary into its foreign parent, the subsidiary generally would be required to
recognize realized gains (and permitted to recognize realized losses, subject to
limitations) with respect to its assets that are distributed in the liquidation. See I.R.C.
§§ 337(a), 367(e); Treas. Reg. § l.367(e)-2(b)(1) (2003). An exception applies where
distributed U.S. business assets continue to be used in a U.S. business by the foreign
parent for the next ten years. See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(e)-2(b)(2)(i) (2003). However,

1250

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 25:1219
50

However, because a U.S. branch is less able to accumulate earnings/
and may be subject to the recapture rule with respect to a portion of
its accumulated earnings,151 it is likely that less U.S. earnings will
escape a second-level tax upon termination of a U.S. branch than
upon liquidation of a U.S. subsidiary.
Thus, the substantive
differences between the branch profits tax and the dividend tax
appear to be significant.
In part because the branch profits tax is more onerous than the
dividend tax, commentators generally recommend that foreign
corporations avoid conducting U.S. businesses in branch form and
152
instead use U.S. subsidiaries. Thus, while the branch profits tax was
this exception would not be available in circumstances that are analogous to a foreign
corporation's complete termination of its U.S. branch, because a U.S. business would
no longer exist. Consequently, the liquidation of a similarly situated U.S. subsidiary
would be a taxable event to the subsidiary. On the complete termination of a U.S.
branch, a foreign corporation may well be disposing of its U.S. assets and thereby
recognizing gains and losses on these assets. This is because the foreign corporation is
required to have no U.S. assets in order to terminate completely its U.S. business. See
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-2T(a)(2)(i)(A) (1996). However, it is also possible for a
foreign corporation to convert a U.S. asset into a non-U.S asset by repositioning the
asset in a foreign business, although there are some limits on doing so as a result of
sections 864(c)(6) and 864(c)(7). See supra notes 101-38 and accompanying text
(discussion of U.S. assets); I.R.c. §§ 864(c)(6) (effectively connected status of
deferred income is determined based on the underlying transaction), 864(c)(7)
(property formerly used in a U.S. business and disposed of within ten years after
cessation of such use will be treated as so used at the time of the disposition); cf
I.R.S. Priv. Let. Rul. 96-11-042 (Dec. 14, 1995) (regardless of whether foreign
corporation continues to be engaged in a U.S. business, outstanding loans still
constitute U.S. assets because interest income on the loans is effectively connected
under section 864(c)(6) and any gain realized would be effectively connected under
section 864(c)(7)). Even so, any gain on the disposition of a former U.S. asset
apparently would be treated as effectively connected income if the asset is disposed of
within ten years after its use in the U.S. business. See I.R.c. § 864(c)(7); see, e.g.,
I.R.S. Priv. Let. Rul. 200-018-027 (Feb. 1, 2000). Nevertheless, to bring about more
similar treatment in the U.S. branch and subsidiary settings upon the termination of a
U.S. business, consideration should be given to requiring a foreign corporation to
recognize gains (and losses, with possible limits) where it converts U.S. assets to nonU.S. assets in the absence of a disposition.
150 See supra Parts lILA and III.B.
151 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
152 See Robert F. Hudson, Jr., Current Techniques for Foreign Investment in U.S.
Real Estate - Income and Estate Tax Considerations, 22 TAX NOTES INT'L 3027,3028,
3039 (2001); Hirschfeld & Grossman, supra note 18, at 38-39; Blessing, supra note 46,
at 638 (listing other tax factors as well that favor the use of a U.S. subsidiary,
including lack of statutory treating-shopping restrictions, ability to file consolidated
returns, foreign corporate records being less relevant, and state income and franchise
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aimed at reducing the disparity between the taxation of foreign
corporations' U.S. branch and subsidiary operations by subjecting
branch earnings to a second-level tax, as implemented the tax goes too
far in this direction and thereby appears to discourage the use of
I53
branches.
The next Part explores certain measures for making the
branch profits tax more like the dividend tax to effectuate Congress's
desire for branch/subsidiary neutrality in imposing second-level taxes.

tax allocation formulas); Aaron A. Rubinstein & Angela W.Y. Yu, The Benefits and
Burdens of the Final Branch Level Taxes Regulations, INT'L TAX J., Spring 1994, 58,
58-60 (branch profits tax regulations do not provide parity for U.S. subsidiaries and
U.S. branches because the control of timing that exists for subsidiaries is lost for
branches); cf Genz, supra note 61, at 135-36 (pointing out that while there is no
"cookie-cutter" analysis for determining whether to use a U.S. subsidiary or U.S.
branch to conduct a U.S. business, the following factors have tended to create a
preference for using a U.S. subsidiary: complexity of the branch tax rules, the
difficulty in establishing qualified residency for claiming treaty benefits under the
branch tax rules, the expense of compliance, and the fact that it is relatively easy for a
U.S. subsidiary to control distributions (subject to corporate penalty tax constraints)
whereas constructive remittances under the branch profits tax can occur quite
unexpectedly); Lau & Auster, supra note 77, at 60-61 (noting that among other
considerations, the complexity and burden of the branch level taxes have played a
role in the traditional use of U.S. subsidiaries by foreign corporations doing business
in the United States, but pointing out that with recent developments such as the
check-the-box regulations, a single member LLC treated as a branch may provide
greater tax benefits because of the ability to offset income in the foreign corporation's
home country). An exception may exist where the foreign corporation has treaty
protection against the branch profits tax. See Blessing, supra note 46, at 638. Another
tax reason for preferring U.S. subsidiaries over U.S. branches may be the intricacies
of the branch profits tax; avoiding the tax requires continuous monitoring of a foreign
corporation's U.S. assets and liabilities, whereas avoiding the dividend tax merely
requires refraining from making distributions. See Newton, supra note 144, at 524-25.
The lack of guidance for attributing profits to branches for purposes of applying
income tax treaties may also create a disincentive for using the branch structure. See
Sprague, supra note 18, at 973.
153 See Blessing, supra note 46, at 647 (concluding that the principal effect of the
branch taxes appears to be that future U.S. operations generally will be conducted
through U.S. subsidiaries, and that while Congress intended to achieve neutrality, the
provision may discourage the use of branches by foreign corporations); Masek, supra
note 102, at 145-46; cf Groff & Hoch, supra note 55, at 368 (concluding that while the
branch profits tax achieves parity with the taxation of U.S. subsidiaries in some
respects, it may favor the use of U.S. subsidiaries by foreign banks in other respects).
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MODIFYING THE BRANCH PROFITS TAX TO MAKE IT MORE
EQUIVALENT TO THE DIVIDEND TAX

A. Overview

As explained below, with certain modifications the branch profits
tax would do a better job of effectuating Congress's intent to reduce
the disparity in the taxation of U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries.
Specifically, this Part suggests and examines two changes to the
liability reduction election for making the branch profits tax more
equivalent to the application of dividend tax in the subsidiary setting:
(i) eliminating the potential for recapture upon the termination of a
U.S. branch where a foreign corporation elects to reduce its U.S.
liabilities, and (ii) removing the U.S. booked liability limitation under
the election to reduce U.S. liabilities. This Part also examines a third,
arguably more radical measure for bridging the gap between the
branch profits and dividend taxes - providing foreign corporations
with an election to treat investment assets generating U.S. source
income as effectively connected assets - as well as a variation on this
measure that is contingent on changes to the application of the
1s4
accumulated earnings tax in the subsidiary setting.
The neutrality policy underlying the branch profits tax supports
these measures for making the branch profits tax more equivalent to
the dividend tax in the subsidiary setting. 155 With the corporate
penalty taxes typically allowing for generous accumulations,ls6 a
foreign corporation using a U.S. subsidiary to conduct a U.S. business
generally can avoid a second-level tax on the subsidiary's earnings by
having the subsidiary invest the earnings in assets that it holds, or
effectively doing the same by using the earnings to pay down its
liabilities. Because the income generated by invested earnings will be
57
subject to net basis taxation by the United States/ there will be a tax
154 Some commentators have intimated an even more radical idea, in questioning
whether it is sound policy to subject any U.S. source income to gross basis taxation in
situations where a foreign person has U.S. business properties from which to collect
taxes.
See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXT AND PROBLEMS 251 (2001). While this may be
something to consider, this article proposes a more limited measure to advance
neutrality in the application of second-level taxes. See infra Part IV.D.
155 See infra Parts IV.B.l, IV.C.l, IV.D.l, and IV.E.2.
156 See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
157 This is also effectively the case where earnings are used to pay down liabilities
of the U.S. subsidiary, due to the resulting loss of interest deductions that would have
been taken against the U.S. tax base.
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cost to deferring or eliminating (if earnings are retained until
159
Consequently, a foreign
liquidation '58 ) the second-level tax.
corporation using a U.S. subsidiary to conduct a U.S. business usually
has a choice of whether to incur a second-level tax or instead have the
income on invested earnings continue to be taxed by the United States
on a net basis. As explained in detail below, the measures proposed in
this article allow for a similar result in the branch setting, and thus
promote neutrality in the application of the branch profits and
160
dividend taxes.
Besides the branch profits tax, concerns of branch/subsidiary
neutrality are evident in several other features of international
l61
taxation, such as the deemed paid credit and the look-through rules
162
Furthermore, eliminating
under the foreign tax credit mechanism.
disparities in the taxation of branches and subsidiaries is consistent
Treaty
with certain principles embodied in tax treaties.
nondiscrimination articles generally require that a treaty country shall
not tax a permanent establishment of a nonresident enterprise less
favorably than a resident enterprise carrying on the same activities. '63
While many treaties now specifically exempt the U.S. branch profits
tax from the ban on discriminatory taxes,l64 this appears to be
predicated on Congress's view that the branch profits tax treats
foreign corporations with U.S. branches no worse than the dividend
tax treats foreign corporations with U.S. subsidiaries. '65 As explained

See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
159 See Blum, supra note 75, at 614-15.
160 Cf id. (stating that the branch profits tax imposes a second-level U.S. tax
when U.S. branch earnings are reinvested outside the scope of net basis U.S. taxation,
and that this makes the tax treatment of a U.S. branch closer to that of a U.S.
subsidiary). Indeed, the tax treatment of the invested earnings appears to be the only
relevant and sensible determinant in comparing distributions within a legal entity (the
branch setting) to distributions between legal entities (the subsidiary setting). In fact,
Congress appears to have recognized this, given that it intended for U.S. net equity
under the branch profits tax to include only those assets and liabilities that generate
income taxable by the United States on a net basis. See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9,
at 1040.
161 See 1.R.c. § 902.
162 See 1.R.c. § 904(d).
163 See, e.g., MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at art. 24, para. 2.
164 See, e.g., MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at art. 24, para. 5.
165 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1038; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 12, at
402; H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, supra note 12, at 433 (calling for Treasury to renegotiate
outstanding treaties to permit the application of the branch profits tax).
158
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166

above, however, this is not the case.
Indeed, the American Law
Institute rejected an approach for implementing a branch remittance
tax that would deem all branch earnings to have been remitted
regardless of actual remittances, because of the concern that
automatically subjecting a branch to an additional tax burden, when
compared to a similarly-situated U.S. corporation, may well violate
167
Consequently, the principles, if
treaty nondiscrimination clauses.
not the current requirements, of treaty nondiscrimination articles also
support measures for equalizing the application of second-level taxes
with respect to branches and subsidiaries.
The measures suggested by this article, however, raise issues of
potential conflicts with other policies governing the taxation of U.S.
branches. In particular, as explained below, measures for eliminating
substantive differences in the application of the branch profits tax and
dividend tax may be at odds with the fungibility principle underlying
the rules for imputing interest deductions to U.S. branch operations,
as well as the policies supporting the effectively connected income
l68
rules. There may also be the concern that these measures effectively
repeal the branch profits tax or at least drastically minimize its
effect. 169 However, an examination of these potential conflicts
suggests that the measures are consistent with recognized policies
governing the taxation of foreign corporations with U.S. branches.
B. Eliminating the Recapture Rule Contained in the Election to
Reduce U.S. Liabilities
1. Promoting Neutrality

The branch profits tax can be made more similar to a dividend tax
by amending the liability reduction election so as to eliminate the
resulting tax that can occur upon the termination of the U.S. branch.
This measure would result in more neutral treatment of U.S. branches
and U.S. subsidiaries, in that a reduction of U.S. liabilities under the
election is analogous to a U.S. subsidiary's transfer of funds to its
foreign parent to pay down inter-corporate debt, and funds used for
this purpose will not be subject to a second-level U.S. tax upon the
liquidation of the subsidiary.

166
167

168
169

See supra Part III.
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 1~5.
See infra Parts IV.B.2 and IV.D.2.a.
See infra notes 191-94, 253-59, 318-19 and accompanying text.
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As discussed earlier, the regulations allow for an election to
reduce U.S. liabilities for purposes of both determining U.S. net
equity under the branch profits tax and calculating the U.S. branch's
interest deduction under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5, subject to the
limitation that U.S. liabilities may not be reduced below the amount
170
of U.S. booked liabilities.
However, the regulations generally
provide that to the extent the foreign corporation does not ultimately
make investments resulting in additional U.S. net equity in an amount
equal to the earnings accumulating as a result of the election, the
foreign corporation must recapture that amount as a dividend
equivalent amount in the year that the U.S. branch is completely
l7l
terminated.
As indicated in the preamble to the final branch profits tax
regulations, the election to reduce liabilities was intended to permit a
foreign corporation to accumulate earnings in non-U.S. assets for later
capital investment in the U.S. business.172 Even though the earnings
are invested in non-U.S. assets, the earnings are shielded from the
branch profits tax by the additional U.S. net equity resulting from the
reduction in U.S. liabilities, at least until the termination of the U.S.
branch. Consequently, the election essentially provides a foreign
corporation with more time to make investments in U.S. assets in
order to avoid the imposition of the branch profits tax.173 While the
accumulated earnings do not directly generate income subject to net
basis U.S. tax (because they are not invested in U.S. assets), the loss of
interest deductions resulting from reduced U.S. liabilities appears to
be a surrogate for imposing U.S. tax on the income from these
174
assets.
See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
171 See supra note 71-72 and accompanying text.
172 See T.D. 8432, 1992-2 c.B. 157, 159.
In this regard, the liability reduction
election replaced the expansion capital election contained in the proposed and
temporary regulations, the latter being viewed by Treasury as ineffective and complex
(if properly drafted) in permitting accumulations of expansion capital in what would
otherwise be non-U.S. assets. See id.
173 See Lau & Auster, supra note 77, at 41 n.13 (noting that the election to reduce
liabilities effectively defers the branch profits tax). The liability reduction election
can also result in a permanent elimination of the branch profits tax even where
amounts are not ultimately invested in additional U.S. assets, if the election is made
for a year in which there is positive current ECEP, but negative accumulated ECEP.
See supra note 78.
174 Cf Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 73, at 113 n.13 (referring to the loss of
interest deductions under the liability reduction election as comparable to the cost of
the former expansion capital election, which required the investment yield on elected
170

1256

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 25:1219

Thus, the liability reduction election can produce an effect similar
to the accumulation of earnings by a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign
corporation, in that earnings can effectively be retained without the
current imposition of a second level of U.S. tax. However, there are
important differences in the functioning of this feature of the branch
profits tax and a subsidiary's accumulation of earnings. A U.S.
subsidiary of a foreign corporation avoids a dividend tax on its
retained earnings, whether or not accumulated for business needs, and
a second-level tax generally will not apply upon the liquidation of the
175
subsidiary even if the earnings are never devoted to business needs.
Moreover, there appears to be little possibility that the accumulated
earnings tax would apply on the retained earnings of the U.S.
subsidiary as a surrogate for a second-level tax, and the personal
holding company tax, even if potentially applicable, typically should
still allow for generous accumulations without the risk of penalty.176
On the other hand, the branch profits tax is generally imposed upon
the termination of the U.S. branch if the accumulated earnings are not
ultimately invested in U.S. assets, that is, assets that produce
effectively connected income, which generally means that to
permanently avoid the branch profits tax, the accumulated earnings
ultimately must be invested in assets that bear some connection to the
177
Moreover, additional U.S.
business conducted by the U.S. branch.
assets are likely to give rise to additional U.S. liabilities;178
consequently, a foreign corporation would probably need to increase
its investment in U.S. assets by an amount that is considerably greater
than the earnings accumulated pursuant to the liability reduction
election in order to avoid a branch profits tax upon termination of the
179
U.S. branch.
As a result, these features make the imposition of the
branch profits tax more likely than the imposition of second-level
180
taxes in the subsidiary setting.
securities to be included as effectively connected income). The cost of reducing
liabilities may be offset to an extent by a resulting reduction in excess interest tax
liability. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
[75
See supra notes 81-82,146 and accompanying text.
[76
See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
[77
See supra notes 101-38 and accompanying text. See supra note 78 and
accompanying text for a situation where the tax can be avoided even without a
subsequent investment in U.S. assets.
[78 See supra notes 43, 56-60 and accompanying text.
[79 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
[SO It is not clear whether Treasury was aware of this difference when drafting the
regulations. Treasury included the recapture rule out of concern that repeated
liability reduction elections could result in substantial deferral of branch profits tax
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There is, however, a more fundamental problem with the current
liability reduction election in light of the neutrality policy underlying
the branch profits tax. The recapture rule contained in the provision
results in dissimilar treatment for foreign corporations with U.S.
branches versus those with U.S. subsidiaries because a reduction of
U.S. liabilities under the election is analogous to a U.S. subsidiary's
transfer of funds to its foreign parent to pay down inter-corporate
debt, and funds used for this purpose will not be subject to a secondlevel U.S. tax upon the liquidation of the subsidiary.
The amount of liabilities subject to reduction in the U.S. branch
setting, i.e., the excess of U.S. liabilities over U.S. booked liabilities, is
18l
analogous to d~bt owed by a U.S. subsidiary to its foreign parent.
Thus, where a foreign corporation elects to reduce its U.S. liabilities
to eliminate or reduce a dividend equivalent amount, the appropriate
analogy in the U.S. subsidiary setting is the subsidiary's use of funds to
satisfy liabilities owed to its foreign parent. Upon a pay down of
inter-corporate liabilities in the subsidiary setting, funds earned by the
liability, as well as its elimination upon the complete termination of the U.S. branch
under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-2T(a). See Genz, supra note 61, at 134. Thus,
Treasury concluded that accumulated earnings resulting from reductions in U.S.
liabilities ultimately had to be invested in U.S. assets, or else the branch profits tax
would eventually be imposed on the accumulated earnings. Perhaps Treasury was
under the impression that the accumulated earnings tax would be potentially
applicable in all cases involving U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations; what is
apparently the first in a series of private letter rulings taking the opposite view was
issued the same year that the final regulations were promulgated, although the
regulation that the ruling applied had been issued in 1959. See T.D. 6377, 1959-1 c.s.
125; supra note 88 and accompanying text. Or perhaps Treasury thought that with the
possible reduction in excess interest tax liability, the loss of interest deductions
pursuant to the election was not a sufficient surrogate for taxing the income generated
by the accumulated earnings. However, the foreign corporations that are in a position
to use the election may well have a minimal reduction in excess interest tax liability as
a result of the election. See supra note 74. It is possible that Treasury felt compelled
by the statute and legislative history to give the branch profits tax some real "teeth,"
despite the resulting differences when compared to the application of second-level
taxes in the subsidiary setting. However, the statute and legislative history give
Treasury latitude in defining U.S. assets and U.S. liabilities, provided these definitions
are consistent with those used to determine assets and liabilities that give rise to
effectively connected taxable income. See I.R.C. § 884(c)(2); 1986 Bluebook, supra
note 9, at 1040. And by crafting the recapture rule, Treasury is not taking into
account the policy of branch/subsidiary neutrality that underlies the branch profits
tax. See infra notes 181-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of a more
fundamental problem with the recapture rule.
181 This is the conceptualization for the branch level tax on excess interest
contained in section 884(f)(1)(B). See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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u.s.

subsidiary can be invested in assets whose income will not be
subject to U.S. net basis taxation, yet without a dividend tax on the
IS2
Similarly, in the branch setting, the liability
transferred amounts.
reduction election allows funds earned through U.S. branch
operations to be invested in noneffectively connected assets, free of a
current branch profits tax. And in both settings, the events result in
fewer liabilities for determining interest deductions taken against the
U.S. tax base. To this extent neutrality is achieved - a U.S. branch
has the same opportunity as a U.S. subsidiary to shift funds outside of
the United States without incurring a current second-level tax, by
reducing the amount of liabilities that are taken into account for U.S.
tax purposes.
However, unlike what occurs under the branch profits tax because
of the recapture rule, funds earned by the U.S. subsidiary that are
used to pay down inter-corporate debt will not be subject to a second
level of U.S. tax upon the liquidation of the subsidiary.ls3 There is no

182 Upon the repayment of a loan made by a foreign parent to its U.S. subsidiary,
the parent would not have any gross income, assuming the payment equaled the
parent's adjusted basis in the debt instrument. See I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1271(a).
Consequently, there generally should be no FDAP income for purposes of section
881(a) on the repayment of the loan. See Treas. Reg. § 1.l441-2(b)(1) (2000) (noting
that FDAP income requires that there be gross income). Nevertheless, there is the
possibility that debt could be reclassified as stock for tax purposes if, for example, the
U.S. subsidiary is thinly capitalized. See generally BIITKER & EUSTICE, supra note 91,
at 4-41 to -53. If that were to occur, the repayment of the debt would be treated as a
redemption of stock that would be taxable to the foreign parent as a dividend (to the
extent of the subsidiary's E&P). See 1.R.c. §§ 302(b), (d), 301(c), 316(a), 881(a);
BIITKER & EUSTICE, supra note 91, at 4-57 (pointing out that the repayment of a
purported loan that is reclassified as equity would be treated as a stock redemption,
with the substantial risk of being taxed as a dividend). It should be noted that there is
also the potential for debt/equity reclassification in the case of a foreign corporation
with a U.S. branch. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5, the Service has the ability to
reclassify a foreign corporation's purported debt as equity for purposes of
determining the foreign corporation's actual liability-to-asset ratio, which is used to
impute liabilities to the U.S branch (if the foreign corporation elects to use its actual
ratio). See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(c)(2)(ii), (c)(5), ex. 1 (1996); supra note 43. If
reclassification were to occur in the branch setting, U.S. liabilities would be reduced.
To bring about similar consequences for U.S. branches and subsidiaries upon
reclassification, consideration should be given to disregarding an elective reduction of
U.S. liabilities to the extent that U.S. liabilities have been reduced as a result of
debt/equity reclassification. With this approach, reclassification in the branch setting
could produce a dividend equivalent amount, which would be analogous to the
dividend consequences upon reclassification in the subsidiary setting.
183 Moreover, even though the pay down of inter-corporate liabilities would not
reduce E&P, the earnings represented by the transferred funds would never be
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recapture of these amounts as a dividend upon liquidation, regardless
of whether there are subsequent infusions of assets into the subsidiary.
For example, assume that a foreign corporation initially capitalizes its
wholly owned U.S. subsidiary with $1,000,000 of assets, taking back
$500,000 of stock and $500,000 of debt. In its first year of operations,
the subsidiary has $500,000 of earnings and profits and uses these
l84
funds to payoff the $500,000 liability owed to its foreign parent.
The next year the U.S. subsidiary liquidates.
The liquidating
185
distribution of assets should be tax-free to the foreign parent.
In comparison, assume that a foreign corporation establishes a
U.S. branch by investing $1,000,000 in effectively connected assets,
with $500,000 of liabilities imputed to the U.S. branch pursuant to
Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5. In its first year of operations, the U.S. branch
has $500,000 of effectively connected E&P. The foreign corporation
does not invest any of its U.S. earnings in effectively connected assets,
but elects to reduce its U.S. liabilities to zero, resulting in a dividend
l86
The next year the foreign
equivalent amount of zero for the year.
corporation completely terminates the U.S. branch. While generally
87
tax-free/ the complete termination of the U.S. branch in this case
results in a $500,000 dividend equivalent amount under the recapture
rule, given that the foreign corporation had elected to reduce its U.S.
liabilities and did not (prior to the year of the complete termination)
increase its investment in U.S. net equity by an amount equal to the
effectively connected E&P that accumulated as a result of the liability

subject to a dividend tax provided that subsequent nonliquidating distributions by the
subsidiary do not exceed subsequent E&P. Furthermore, there appears to be little
possibility that the subsidiary would be subject to the corporate penalty taxes on these
earnings. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text. Even in the atypical case
where the accumulated earnings tax would be potentially applicable, the tax should
not apply if, after paying down inter-corporate liabilities, the subsidiary's remaining
assets consist of operating assets and other assets held for the reasonable needs of its
business (which should be the case where the funds originally borrowed from the
foreign parent were used for this purpose). Cf infra note 312. Under these facts, the
personal holding company tax also is not likely to apply. Cf supra notes 94-98 and
accompanying text.
184 The repayment of the loan generally should be tax-free to the foreign parent.
See supra note 182.
185 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
186 In light of the U.S. booked liability limitation on reducing liabilities, it is
assumed that the foreign corporation has U.S. booked liabilities of zero, thereby
allowing U.S. liabilities to be reduced to zero.
187 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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reduction election. ISS
While there are certainly legal differences between the reduction
of liabilities imputed to a U.S. branch for tax purposes and a U.S.
subsidiary's pay down of liabilities owed to its foreign parent, the
branch profits tax is concerned purely with the tax consequences of
transactions as opposed to their legal consequences. For example, a
remittance of funds within a single foreign corporation should have no
legal consequences, yet this transaction can clearly result in branch
189
Thus, in evaluating the
profits tax liability for the particular year.
branch profits tax in terms of neutrality, it is appropriate to consider
the tax consequences of the reduction of liabilities in the branch and
subsidiary settings despite the legal differences involved. This analysis
indicates that eliminating the recapture rule would promote tax
neutrality in the application of second-level taxes with regard to U.S.
l90
branches and U.S. subsidiaries.
It may be contended that without the recapture rule, foreign
corporations would often make the election to reduce their U.S.
91
liabilities/ resulting in lower dividend equivalent amounts with no
See supra note 71.
See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
190 Besides the recapture tax in the branch setting, another difference in the two
situations analyzed above is that the foreign corporation would likely include the
amount by which it reduced its U.S. liabilities as part of its U.S.-connected liabilities
for purposes of determining its interest deduction for the year of complete
termination. This is because the election to reduce U.S. liabilities is done annually
(see supra note 70), and the foreign corporation would have no need to reduce its U.S.
liabilities for the year of complete termination given that the branch profits tax would
not apply for this year (aside from the recapture rule), see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.8842T(a)(1) (2006), unless it did so to reduce its excess interest tax exposure for that
year. In contrast, a U.S. subsidiary would not receive interest deductions for the year
of liquidation on the amount by which it reduced its liabilities. Consequently, so that
U.S. branches do not receive an advantage over U.S. subsidiaries in this regard, with
the elimination of the recapture rule, I recommend that the amount of U.S.-connected
liabilities for the year of complete termination be reduced by the amount of the
liability reduction for the previous year, regardless of whether the election is
continued for the year of complete termination.
In commenting on the temporary and proposed branch profits tax regulations,
commentators have similarly proposed allowing foreign corporations to reduce the
amount of liabilities imputed to U.S. branches (and without any mention of the need
for a recapture rule upon termination of the U.S. branch), in order to promote
neutrality for U.S. branches and subsidiaries. See Peat Marwick Comments, supra
note 16 (proposing that liabilities not be imputed to investment assets that are elected
to be treated as effectively connected assets); Institute of International Bankers
Comments, supra note 16.
191 However, even without the recapture rule, there may be reasons why foreign
188

189
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restoration of these amounts upon the termination of the U.S. branch.
Thus, the elimination of the recapture rule may significantly reduce
the amount of tax imposed under Code section 884(a). However,
there are limits on a foreign corporation's ability to lower its annual
dividend equivalent amount by reducing U.S. liabilities, given the U.S.
192
booked liability limitation.
Consequently, significant exposure to
the section 884(a) tax is possible even with a liability reduction
election that can permanently eliminate a portion of the branch
profits tax liability. More importantly, the election to reduce U.S.
liabilities would carry with it a cost - the loss of interest deductions
193
for purposes of determining effectively connected taxable income.
Consequently, the branch profits tax would continue to affect, albeit
indirectly, the U.S. tax liability of foreign corporations' U.S. branch
operations, and to the same extent that the dividend tax affects
similarly situated U.S. subsidiaries. That is, for both U.S. branches
and U.S. subsidiaries, second-level taxes can be avoided only at the
cost of having the income generated by the invested earnings subject
to net basis taxation by the United States, which is effectively the case
194
with the loss of interest deductions.
2. Potential Conflict with the Policies Supporting the Fungibility
Approach for Imputing Liabilities
While advancing neutrality, the elimination of the recapture rule
may violate the policies supporting the fungibility approach for
imputing liabilities to U.S. branches. However, while this measure
would allow a foreign corporation to reduce the liability-to-asset ratio
of its U.S. branch below that of the foreign corporation as a whole (or,
alternatively, below a fixed ratio )/95 a ceiling on a U.S. branch's
corporations would refrain from electing to reduce liabilities. See supra note 75.
192 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
193 This is mitigated to a degree by the possible reduction in excess interest tax
liability. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
194 In terms of the previous examples, the $500,000 of U.S. earnings will
effectively generate income subject to U.S. net basis taxation. That is, prior to the
realization of these earnings, there was $500,000 of net assets ($1,000,000 of assets less
$500,000 of liabilities) generating taxable income subject to u.S. tax. After the
realization of the earnings and reduction of liabilities, there are $1,000,000 of net
assets ($1,000,000 of assets less $0 liabilities) generating taxable income subject to
u.S. tax.
195 As mentioned previously and amplified below, with the recapture rule, the
current liability reduction election really represents a deferred imposition of the
branch profits tax rather than an actual deviation from the fungibility approach. See
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liability-to-asset ratio would remain, thus continuing to address the
thin capitalization concerns underlying the fungibility approach.
As discussed previously, Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5, which implements
the fungibility approach for determining interest deductions, imputes
liabilities to the U.S. branch in an amount equal to the amount of U.S.
assets multiplied by either the foreign corporation's actual worldwide
l96
By giving a foreign
liability-to-asset ratio or a fixed ratio.
corporation the flexibility to reduce its U.S. branch liability-to-asset
ratio below the prescribed ratio, the suggested measure arguably
conflicts with the fungibility approach governing the amount of capital
allocated to U.S. branches. Of course, given that the current election
permits a foreign corporation to reduce its U.S.-connected liabilities
below the amount calculated under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5, the
elimination of the recapture component of the current election may
be viewed as resulting in no greater deviation from the fungibility
concept. However, because of the potential for recapture, the election
to reduce liabilities effectively results in the delayed remittance of
U.S. earnings that are not ultimately invested in U.S. assets, as
197
opposed to a decrease in the liability-to-asset ratio of U.S. branch.
The resulting loss of interest deductions apparently represents a
surrogate for imposing U.S. tax on the income from the investment in
198
Without recapture, however, we understand the
non-U.S. assets.
foreign corporation to be using funds earned through U.S. branch
operations to satisfy constructive inter-branch liabilities, thereby
running counter to the fungibility approach for allocating liabilities
and capital to U.S. branches of foreign corporations.
While an election to reduce liabilities without the recapture rule
arguably offends the fungibility concept, it does not violate what
appears to be the key policy underlying fungibility: ensuring that a
U.S. branch has an adequate amount of capital for tax purposes. In
establishing the fungibility approach for allocating interest deductions,
it appears that Treasury was mainly concerned with the ability of
taxpayers to manipulate the tax results under a booking approach for
199
For example, under a booking
determining branch liabilities.
supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text; infra notes 197-98 and accompanying
text.
196 See supra note 43.
197 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
198 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
199 cf Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(a) (2004) (stating that the "fungibility approach
recognizes that all activities and property require funds and that management has a
great deal of flexibility as to the source and use of funds"); 1986 Bluebook, supra note
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approach, a taxpayer would be able to allocate interest deductions to
effectively connected income, and thus reduce the U.S. tax base,
simply by having liabilities booked at the U.S. branch. Thus, the
fungibility approach was apparently aimed at addressing the concern
of having an excessive amount of liabilities and interest expense
2
allocated to U.S. activities. °O Similarly, under the separate entity
approach for taxing branch operations, which is supported by the
OEeD as well as authorized under some U.S. tax treaties,201 the
202
concern is whether the branch has too little capital, not too much.
That the real concern is preventing excessive amounts of liabilities is
further borne out by the fact that Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 uses a
modified fungibility approach which permits a foreign corporation, for
203
administrative reasons, to use a fixed liability-to-asset ratio. The use
9, at 944 (describing how taxpayers could use a strict separate company method to
allocate interest expense against foreign source income by adjusting the location of
borrowing within an affiliated group).
200 Cf Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 120 (1999)
(stating the government's position that the fungibility approach contained in Treas.
Reg. § 1.882-5 serves as a simple yet effective means of allocating capital to U.S.
branches and preventing manipulation to shift income for tax avoidance purposes);
I.R.S. Notice 2005-53, 2005-32 IRB 263, 263 (Aug. 8,2005) (stating that Treasury and
the Service continue to believe that Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 results in a sufficient
allocation of equity capital to a permanent establishment while addressing the effect
of the recent treaties with the United Kingdom and Japan on its application).
201 See Convention Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Japan For the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Japan, art. 7,
Nov. 6, 2003, S. TREATY DOc. No. 108-14 (2003); Convention Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland For the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income and
on Capital Gains, U.S.-UK., art. 7, July 24, 2001, S. TREATY Doc. No. 107-19 (2002).
202 See US. Treasury Releases Technical Explanation of Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty,
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Feb. 25, 2004) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNI file, elec. cit.,
2004 WTD 39-11) (part 1 of 2) (pointing out "that a permanent establishment cannot
be funded entirely by debt, but must have sufficient capital to carryon its activities"
in the course of explaining Article 7, paragraph 3, as interpreted by diplomatic notes);
U.S. Treasury Department Releases Technical Explanation of Proposed UK.-US.
Income Tax Treaty and Protocol, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Mar. 5,2003) (LEXIS,
FEDT AX lib., TNI file, elec. cit., 2003 WTD 45-27) (part 1 of 2) (same); Molly Moses,
IRS Official Responds to Comments on OECD Paper for PE Profit Attribution, 2004
BNA DAILY TAX REP. No. 89, at G-4 (May 10, 2004) (stating that the basic concept
underlying the GECD method of allocating capital is that the permanent
establishment should have sufficient capital to support its functions and risks). See
generally Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 491 (2003).
203 See supra note 43.
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of the fixed ratio by electing foreign corporations offends pure
fungibility, given that the liability ratio of the U.S. branch will deviate
204
from that of the entire corporation. However, as with the use of the
fixed liability ratio, elimination of the recapture rule would still result
in a cap on the liabilities attributed to the U.S. branch. Consequently,
providing foreign corporations with the flexibility to increase the
capital of their U.S. branches for tax purposes is not inconsistent with
205
the central policy underlying the fungibility approach.
C. Removing the U.S. Booked Liability Limitation Under the

Election to Reduce U.S. Liabilities
1. Promoting Neutrality

Tax neutrality between U.S. branches and subsidiaries would be
advanced by permitting a foreign corporation to lower its dividend
equivalent amount by reducing its U.S. liabilities below the amount of
U.S. booked liabilities. This is because such a further reduction in
U.S. liabilities is analogous to a foreign parent's assumption of third
party liabilities of its U.S. subsidiary in connection with the transfer of
funds by the subsidiary to the parent. This type of transaction is not
subject to a dividend tax.
As discussed earlier, in allowing for the liability reduction
election, the regulations prohibit a foreign corporation from reducing
206
its U.S. liabilities below the amount of U.S. booked liabilities. Even
with the liability reduction election as a way of permitting the
accumulation of earnings for later capital investment in the U.S.
204 Alternatively, the use of the fixed ratio may indicate that Treasury views the
administrative benefits of avoiding the calculation (and verification) of an actual
liability-to-asset ratio as outweighing any benefits derived from using a pure
fungibility of liabilities approach. The same can be said about the neutrality benefits
of eliminating the recapture rule.
205 As far as another potential policy conflict, it may be pointed out that lessening
the impact of the branch profits tax may substantially benefit foreign financial
institutions and insurance companies, who, unlike other foreign corporations, often
prefer to structure their U.S. operations as branches for nontax reasons. See John 0.
Hatab, u.s. Taxation of Foreign Banking in the United States - An Overview, 41
N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 27.01[1], at 27-2 (1983); Rubinstein & Yu, supra
note 152, at 58-59; Henry J. Birnkrant et aI., Prop. Reg. 1.882-5 Overhauls Interest
Allocation for u.s. Branches, 3 J. INT'L TAX'N 166, 166 (1992). However, there is no
indication that Congress enacted the branch profits tax in order to exact a heavier tax
toll on foreign corporations engaged in banking or insurance businesses, as compared
to other foreign-controlled U.S. businesses.
206 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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business, there is not an obvious need for imposing such a limit on
207
While a greater amount of earnings could be
reducing liabilities.
temporarily invested in non-U.S. assets without a current branch
profits tax liability in the absence of such a limit, there would also be
increased costs, as reducing U.S. liabilities below the amount of U.S.
booked liabilities would result in a greater loss of interest deductions
for U.S. tax purposes. Perhaps Treasury felt that for purposes of
determining interest deductions, U.S. booked liabilities "belong" to
the U.S. branch to a greater extent than the excess of U.S liabilities
over U.S. booked liabilities, and that therefore a foreign corporation
208
should not be permitted to reduce U.S. liabilities below this amount.
However, the key determinant in computing a foreign corporation's
interest deductions is the amount of U.S.-connected liabilities, not
U.S. booked liabilities. While the interest rate on U.S. booked
liabilities is used to impute interest expense to U.S.-connected
liabilities (to the extent of U.S. booked liabilities) under the adjusted
U.S. booked liabilities method,209 the regulations effectively remove a
portion of U.S. booked liabilities from the computation to the extent
that U.S.-connected liabilities are less than U.S. booked liabilities.
This removal is performed by mUltiplying the interest expense on U.S.
booked liabilities by the ratio of U.S.-connected liabilities to U.S.
210
booked liabilities.
Consequently, U.S. booked liabilities should not
207 In this regard, the preamble to the final regulations adopting the liability
reduction election is silent as to the reasons for the U.S. booked liability limitation.
See T.D. 8432, 1992-2 C.B. 157.
208 This view may be indicated by the fact that the floor for reducing U.S.
liabilities also includes liabilities that are directly allocable to U.S. assets under Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.861-10T, which, like U.S. booked liabilities, appear to bear a stronger
connection to the operations of the U.S. branches as compared to other liabilities of
the foreign corporation. See supra note 69; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-lOT (1988).
209 This is the effect of the adjusted U.S. booked liability method. When U.S.connected liabilities exceed U.S. booked liabilities, the interest deduction allocable to
effectively connected income is the total of the interest paid or accrued by the U.S.
branch on U.S. booked liabilities, plus the excess of U.S.-connected liabilities over
U.S. booked liabilities multiplied by the foreign corporation's interest rate on U.S.dollar liabilities that are booked outside the United States; when U.S. booked
liabilities exceed U.S.-connected liabilities, the interest deduction allocable to
effectively connected income is the interest paid or accrued by the U.S. branch on
U.S. booked liabilities, multiplied by the ratio of U.S.-connected liabilities to U.S.
booked liabilities. See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(d)(4), (d)(5) (1996). See generally supra
note 43.
210 See supra note 209.
Moreover, the amount of U.S. booked liabilities is not
relevant under the current separate currency pools method. See Treas. Reg. § 1.8825( e) (1996). It should be noted that the previous version of the separate currency
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be viewed as sacred for purposes of the interest expense
211
Alternatively, the liability reduction limit may
determination.
simply have been intended as a lower cap (as compared to the amount
of U.S. liabilities) on the ability to accumulate earnings for later
capital investment in U.S. assets. The Treasury may have felt that
such a limit, although not mandated by the theory underlying the
election, was appropriate given that the statute does not appear to call
212
for any flexibility in the timing of the tax.
In any event, the limit on the liability reduction election runs
counter to the neutrality concerns underlying the branch profits tax, in
that it results in disparate tax treatment for similarly-situated U.S.
branches and subsidiaries. The limit on the election applies in the
situation where the amount of U.S. booked liabilities equals or
exceeds the amount of U.S. liabilities. Where U.S. booked liabilities
exceed U.S. liabilities, a foreign corporation can be regarded as having
borrowed amounts in the United States to fund activities of its foreign
213
This situation is analogous to a U.S. subsidiary with no
branches.
borrowings from its foreign parent and with total liabilities that are
less than the combined third-party U.S. booked liabilities of the
parent and the subsidiary. In other words, in this situation a portion
of the third-party U.S. booked liabilities is considered a liability of the
foreign parent rather than of the U.S. subsidiary. Where U.S. booked
pools method, which was in effect when Treasury promulgated the branch profits tax
regulations, did use the denominations of U.S. booked liabilities in determining the
currency pools to which the method applied. See former Treas. Reg. § 1.8825(b)(3)(ii) (1981).
211 Another possible reason for the U.S. booked liability limitation is that
Treasury may have conceptualized the liability reduction election as if the branch, as
a hypothetical U.S. subsidiary, were paying down liabilities owed to its foreign parent,
and that this construct only applies to the excess of U.S. liabilities over U.S. booked
liabilities. This is the concept that I have advanced for the current liability reduction
election. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. Such a construct, however,
is inconsistent with the recapture rule. See supra notes 183-90 and accompanying
text. Thus, it appears that, as stated in the preamble to the final regulations, Treasury
crafted the liability reduction election as a means of permitting a foreign corporation
to accumulate expansion capital, as opposed to implementing a construct that
involves the pay down of inter-corporate liabilities. In any event, the application of
the latter construct with respect to third party liabilities supports the elimination of
the U.S. booked liability limitation. See infra notes 213-21 and accompanying text.
212 In this regard, there were fairly stringent limits on treating marketable
securities as effectively connected under the former expansion capital election, the
prior regulatory mechanism for accumulating expansion capital. See infra note 240.
213 See Jessica L. Katz & Charles T. Plambeck, u.s. Income Taxation of Foreign
Corporations, 908 T.M. (BNA) A-25 (2000).
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liabilities exceed U.S. liabilities, a reduction in U.S. liabilities to lower
l4
a dividend equivalent amoune is analogous to a transfer of funds by
the subsidiary to the parent in connection with the parent assuming an
additional portion of the third-party liabilities equal to the reduction
in U.S. liabilities.215 This is because in both the branch and subsidiary
settings, funds generated by U.S. operations would be invested in
assets whose income is not subject to U.S. net basis taxation,216 with a
reduction in the amount of liabilities for determining the interest
expense deduction taken against the U.S. tax base.217
In the subsidiary setting, the amount of a distribution for purposes
of the dividend tax is reduced by the amount of any liability of the
subsidiary that is assumed by the parent in connection with the
218
Thus, the dividend tax will not apply where a U.S.
distribution.
subsidiary transfers funds to its foreign parent and the parent assumes

214 This assumes that the foreign corporation's effectively connected E&P for the
year exceeds the increase in U.S. net equity, disregarding the reduction in U.S.
liabilities.
215 Treasury used a similar construct in analyzing the use of imputed liabilities to
determine U.S. net equity. See Preamble to Temporary and Proposed Regulations
under Section 884, reprinted in Service Issues Branch Profits Tax Regulation, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Aug. 30, 1988) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 88 TNT
178-2) (treating an increase in the amount of liabilities imputed to the U.S. branch as
analogous to a U.S. subsidiary's assumption of a portion of the liabilities of its foreign
parent; apparently viewing a decrease in the branch's imputed liabilities as analogous
to an assumption by a foreign parent of liabilities of its U.S. subsidiary).
216 In the branch setting, this is a result of the assumed fact that effectively
connected E&P exceeds the increase in U.S. net equity, disregarding the reduction in
U.S. liabilities. See supra note 214.
217 As discussed earlier, it is appropriate to consider the tax consequences of the
reduction of liabilities in the branch and subsidiary settings despite the legal
differences involved. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text. In this regard,
it should be noted that the interest rate on U.S. booked liabilities that are treated as
assumed in the branch setting may continue to affect the determination of the U.S.
branch's interest deduction (if the foreign corporation uses the adjusted U.S. booked
liabilities method, see supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text), while the interest
rate on liabilities that are actually assumed in the subsidiary setting will no longer
affect the determination of the U.S. subsidiary's interest deduction. However, this
does not appear to be a significant enough difference to prevent the application of
this construct.
218 See I.R.c. § 301(b)(2). For this purpose, the liability must be assumed within
the meaning of section 3S7(d), which generally requires that (i) in the case of recourse
liabilities, the transferee has agreed to, and is expected to satisfy the liability, whether
or not the transferor is relieved of the liability, and (ii) in the case of nonrecourse
liabilities, the transferee acquires any asset subject to the liability. See Treas. Reg.
§ l.301-1(g)(1) (2003); 1.R.c. § 3S7(d)(1)(A).
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an equal amount of liabilities of the subsidiary.219 To promote the
neutral tax treatment of U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries, a foreign
corporation with a U.S. branch should have the same opportunity to
shift funds outside of the United States without incurring a secondlevel tax, by reducing the amount of liabilities that are taken into
account for U.S. tax purposes. Therefore, neutrality would be better
achieved by permitting a foreign corporation for purposes of the
branch profits tax (and interest deduction calculation) to reduce its
220
U.S. liabilities below the amount of its U.S. booked liabilities.
Upon the termination of the U.S. branch, there should be no
recapture of earnings that are accumulated as a result of the enhanced
election to reduce liabilities, for reasons similar to those expressed in
221
the previous section.
Where a U.S. subsidiary transfers funds to its
foreign parent in connection with the parent's assumption of

219 Although it is unlikely that a shareholder would assume a corporate liability
in connection with a cash distribution (as opposed to property distribution), the
amount of the distribution would be reduced by the liability assumed. See BITIKER &
EUSTICE, supra note 91, at 8-11. If the amount of earnings transferred by the U.S.
subsidiary is equal to the amount of third party liabilities assumed by the foreign
parent, the amount of the distribution would be zero, as the transferred earnings
would be fully offset by the additional third party liabilities assumed by the parent.
With a distribution of zero, there would be no dividend (and therefore no gross
income) under section 301(c)(1). Consequently, there would be no FDAP income for
purposes of section 881(a). See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)(1) (2000) (FDAP income
requires that there be gross income).
220 As noted above, an assumption of liabilities will be treated as occurring in the
U.S. subsidiary setting only if the parties satisfy certain standards contained in
section 357(d). See supra note 218. To bring about similar treatment in the U.S.
branch setting, in connection with this proposal consideration should be given to
limiting a reduction in U.S. liabilities in circumstances that are analogous to those
where section 357(d) would not treat a transferred liability as being assumed. For
example, a reduction below the amount of U.S. booked liabilities could be prevented
where the foreign branches of a foreign corporation have minimal net equity (nonU.S. assets less non-U.S.-connected liabilities (non-U.S. assets multiplied by the
foreign corporation's actual or fixed liability-to-asset ratio)) on the view that a
similarly situated foreign parent would not be expected to satisfy a transferred
recourse liability in this situation. In addition, a reduction below the amount of U.S.
booked nonrecourse liabilities could be prevented to the extent that these liabilities
encumber U.S. assets. Of course, these factors in the branch setting have no bearing
on who is likely to bear the liability (unlike the subsidiary setting); nevertheless, it
may be appropriate to take them into account in permitting a reduction below the
amount of U.S. booked liabilities, in order to prevent a U.S. branch from having a
greater ability to avoid a second-level tax as compared to a similarly situated U.S.
subsidiary.
221 See supra Part IV.B.
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subsidiary liabilities, the foreign parent will not be taxable on the
liquidation of the subsidiary to the extent of the prior transfer,
regardless of whether there are subsequent infusions of assets into the
subsidiary. Likewise, a foreign corporation with a U.S. branch should
not be taxable in the analogous situation upon the termination of the
branch.
While it may be contended that a more available election to
reduce branch liabilities would result in the effective repeal of the
branch profits tax, exposure to the tax may still exist. Once the
foreign corporation reduces its U.S. liabilities to zero, the branch
profits tax would apply to the extent that effectively connected E&P is
not invested in additional U.S assets. 222 More importantly in terms of
neutrality, avoiding the branch profits tax through a more liberal
election would produce an indirect tax cost due to the loss of interest
deductions against effectively connected income. Again, this is similar
to the treatment of a similarly situated U.S. subsidiary, and consistent
with the approach generally allowing for the avoidance of secondlevel taxes at the cost of having the income generated by the invested
earnings subject to net basis U.S. taxation, which is effectively the case
223
with loss of interest deductions.
2. Potential Policy Conflicts

Removing the U.S. booked liability limitation, in conjunction with
eliminating the recapture rule, should not raise any additional policy
conflicts, but would exacerbate the potential conflict examined above.
That is, without this limitation, a foreign corporation would be able to
make further reductions in the liability-to-asset ratio of its U.S.
branch, thus arguably offending fungibility to a greater degree.
However, because liability reductions do not violate the thin
capitalization concerns underlying fungibility,224 an enhanced ability to
reduce branch liabilities should not run counter to this policy.

222 Because banks are so highly leveraged, it appears very unlikely that a U.S.
banking branch would exhaust its ability to use the liability reduction election with
the removal of U.S. booked liability limitation, although there still may be some limits
on reducing U.S. liabilities as discussed at supra note 220. Consequently, the removal
of this limitation may indeed eliminate exposure under the branch profits tax for
foreign banks.
223 See supra note 194.
224 See supra Part IV.B.2.

1270

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 25:1219

D. Providing an Election to Treat Assets as Effectively Connected
1. Promoting Neutrality

Even with the suggested changes to the liability reduction
election, differences would still remain in the application of the
branch profits and dividend taxes. Specifically, aside from reducing its
U.S. liabilities, a foreign corporation could only avoid a branch profits
tax on its U.S. branch earnings to the extent that it invested the
earnings in U.S. assets, that is, assets that generally produce
225
This generally means that the assets
effectively connected income.
must bear some connection to the business conducted by the U.S.
226
branch. In contrast, a similarly situated U.S. subsidiary would avoid
a dividend tax on any earnings that it retains. Moreover, there
appears to be little possibility that the accumulated earnings tax would
apply on the retained earnings of the U.S. subsidiary as a surrogate for
a second-level tax, and the personal holding company tax, even if
potentially applicable, typically should allow for generous
accumulations without the risk of penalty.227 Accordingly, a U.S.
subsidiary would likely not be subject to a second-level tax on
earnings invested by the subsidiary in assets that are unrelated to the
conduct of its U.S. business, whereas a similarly situated U.S. branch
228
may well face a branch profits tax liability in these circumstances.
225 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, it appears very
unlikely that a foreign corporation conducting a U.S. banking business would exhaust
its ability to use the liability reduction election as modified in this article. See supra
note 222. On the other hand, foreign corporations conducting non banking activities
in the United States may well be limited in their ability to accumulate earnings
effectively pursuant to the expanded liability reduction election, given their lower
liability-to-asset ratios. Cf Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 73, at 113 (pointing out
that foreign corporations financed primarily by equity can benefit little from the
current liability reduction election).
226
See supra notes 102-38 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
228 See supra notes 121-38 and accompanying text; Blessing, supra note 46, at 638
(referring to the fact that a U.S. subsidiary can invest earnings in nonbusiness assets
or outside the United States without incurring a second-level tax, and characterizing
this as a potentially significant timing advantage versus operations using a U.S.
branch). An exception would be where a foreign corporation invested its earnings in
U.S. real estate held for investment and elected under section 882(d) to treat the
income with respect to the property as effectively connected. See supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
This assumes that the foreign corporation exhausted its ability to use the liability
reduction election, as modified in this article, to accumulate earnings effectively. As
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Furthermore, unlike a U.S. subsidiary, a U.S. branch would lack the
229
certainty that the earnings will be treated as retained.
Consequently, absent other changes, a U.S. subsidiary would continue
to have greater flexibility and certainty in avoiding a second-level tax
on its earnings as compared to a U.S. branch.
It may be contended that for purposes of a neutrality analysis the
hypothetical U.S. subsidiary construct for a U.S. branch should be
confined to items that bear some factual connection to the foreign
corporation's U.S. business. Accordingly, under this view, U.S.
branch earnings that are invested in assets unrelated to the foreign
corporation's U.S. business should be treated as if they had been
distributed by a hypothetical U.S. subsidiary, thus justifying the
current rules for determining U.S. assets under the branch profits tax.
However, the Congressional reports accompanying the branch profits
tax do not mandate such a construct, and instead appear to espouse a
"tax" approach, as opposed to "factual connection" approach, for
conceptualizing a U.S. branch. According to the legislative history,
U.S. net equity should take into account assets and liabilities that are
230
treated as connected with the business of the U.S. branch. These are
assets and liabilities that generate income that is taxable by the United
23i
States on a net basis.
Further indication of a tax approach is
Congress's intention to apply the branch profits tax to investment
noted earlier, it appears very unlikely for this to occur with respect to a foreign
corporation conducting a U.S. banking business. See supra note 222.
229 See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
230 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1040; S. REP. NO. 99-313, supra note 12, at
404; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 434. As noted earlier, the regulations
implement this approach with respect to liabilities by eschewing a factual relationship
approach and instead using liabilities that are imputed for purposes of computing the
U.S. branch's interest expense deduction. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
It should be noted, however, that the Senate report may call for a factual connection
approach for conceptualizing a U.S. branch, in that the report states that U.S. assets
should include cash needed to meet daily operating expenses, inventory, equipment,
and other assets necessary to operate the business. See S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note
12, at 404. Nevertheless, the report also lists investments generating effectively
connected income as an example of items that should qualify as U.S. assets. See id.
This report goes on to state that U.S. liabilities are liabilities directly related to the
income of the U.S. branch and include payables, short-term obligations, and other
liabilities necessary to meet obligations of the foreign corporation's U.S. business. See
id. Thus, the statements in the Senate report are called into question, as they appear
to endorse a factual relationship approach for determining U.S. liabilities, which is
inconsistent with the explanation provided in the Bluebook, and has been flatly
rejected by Treasury.
231 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1040.
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income from U.S. real property where a foreign corporation has
elected to treat such income as effectively connected pursuant to
section 882( d).232 Thus, expanding the definition of U.S. assets to
include assets unrelated to the foreign corporation's U.S. business
appears to be consistent with the legislative history of the branch
profits tax, provided that the assets are also treated as generating
233
And using a factual
income subject to net basis U.S. taxation.
connection approach to determine the contours of a U.S. branch as a
hypothetical subsidiary ignores the fact that a U.S. subsidiary can
retain its earnings in nonbusiness assets. Thus, a factual connection
approach for conceptualizing a U.S. branch disregards what an actual
subsidiary could do to avoid a dividend tax, an essential factor to
consider in achieving branch/subsidiary neutrality in the imposition of
second-level taxes.
Providing foreign corporations with an election to treat assets as
effectively connected, and thus as U.S. assets, would remove this
disparity in the application of the branch profits and dividend taxes.
Specifically, Congress (or possibly Treasury) should expand the
definition of effectively connected assets to include, upon election by
a foreign corporation, investment assets giving rise to U.S. source
234
As a result, a foreign corporation could avoid the branch
income.

232 See id. In this regard, the regulations provide that for purposes of determining
effectively connected E&P and U.S. assets, effectively connected income includes
income that is treated as effectively connected under any provision of the Code. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(f)(1), (d)(1)(iii) (1996); cf Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(2)(xi) (1996)
(holding that U.S. real estate held for investment is not a U.S. asset where the foreign
corporation did not make an election under section 882(d».
233 Indeed, Treasury apparently came to this conclusion in providing for the
limited expansion capital election in the proposed and temporary branch profits tax
regulations. See infra note 240.
234 This proposal assumes no changes in the law with regard to the application of
the accumulated earnings tax to a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of a foreign
corporation. If, however, a change is made to the accumulated earnings tax, so that it
can potentially apply in all cases in the U.S. subsidiary setting, this article would
continue to recommend that foreign corporations be permitted an election to treat
U.S. source investment assets as effectively connected, but only if the assets are held
to meet the reasonable needs of the foreign corporation's U.S. business. This
alternative is discussed in Part IV.E.
Under the proposal suggested here, only assets generating U.S. source income
would be eligible for effectively connected treatment pursuant to an election.
Because a U.S. subsidiary can accumulate earnings in foreign assets as well as
domestic assets, neutrality suggests that U.S. branches also should be permitted to
elect effectively connected treatment for assets generating foreign source income.
While this may deserve some consideration, U.S. branches should have sufficient
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profits tax by investing its U.S. branch earnings in debt instruments,
stock, or other investment assets generating U.S. source income,235
provided the assets are elected to be treated as effectively
236
connected. As discussed below, a foreign corporation should not be
permitted to elect effectively connected treatment for a greater
amount of assets than is necessary to reduce its dividend equivalent
237
amount to zero for a particular year.
Of course, this change would
(and should) also result in the income from such assets being subject
to net basis taxation under the effectively connected income tax
regime, as opposed to gross basis taxation under the U.S. source/
FDAP income regime.238 This would include current income on
elected assets as well as any gain (or loss) from the disposition of such
239
By so expanding the definition of effectively connected
assets.

flexibility in retammg earnings without extending the election to foreign assets.
Moreover, with the election applying to foreign assets, a foreign corporation may be
entitled to a foreign tax credit (pursuant to section 906) that could deprive the United
States of the ability to tax the income generated by the assets. See I.R.c. § 906. In
this regard, a secondary purpose of the branch profits tax may be to generate revenue
gains by encouraging the reinvestment of U.S. earnings. See Blessing, supra note 46,
at 589 n.18.
Some consideration should be given to excluding foreign banks from having the
election to effectively connect investment assets. As noted earlier, it appears very
unlikely that a foreign corporation conducting a U.S. banking business would exhaust
its ability to use the liability reduction election as modified in this article. See supra
note 222. Consequently, a foreign bank may well avoid any exposure under the
branch profits tax by reducing its U.S. liabilities, and thus may not need an election to
effectively connect assets in order to avoid the tax. On the other hand, a U.S. banking
branch could still benefit from the certainty in retaining earnings that would be
provided by the effectively connected election. See supra note 141; cf infra note 242.
Moreover, a similarly situated U.S. subsidiary would have the ability to avoid a
dividend tax either by retaining earnings or using earnings to pay down its liabilities.
235 As an alternative, an elective, expanded rule for effectively connected assets
could exclude stock. This alternative is addressed in the next section. See infra notes
274-78 and accompanying text.
236 A foreign corporation would be able to couple an election to treat assets as
effectively connected with an election to reduce liabilities, which would allow for an
increase in U.S net equity equal to the full amount invested in elected assets.
237 See infra notes 285-89 and accompanying text.
238 As examined in the next section, this aspect may conflict with polices
underlying the effectively connected income rules. See infra Part IV.D.2.a.
239 Most income tax treaties reduce the rate of tax that the source country can
impose on interest and dividends, as well as generally prevent the source country
from taxing gain from the disposition of property, unless the interest, dividends or
gains are attributable to a permanent establishment or fixed base that a foreign
person has in the source country. See, e.g., MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at
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assets, both U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries could invest in
expansion capital and nonbusiness assets without generally incurring a
second-level tax on the invested earnings, with the income on these
240
investments subject to net basis taxation.
Like a U.S. subsidiary, a

art. 10 (dividends), art. 11 (interest), art. 13 (gains). For income to be attributable to
a permanent establishment, the income generally needs to be derived from the assets
or activities of the permanent establishment. See, e.g., MODEL CONVENTION, supra
note 26, at art. 7, para. 2. Because assets that are elected as effectively connected may
bear no relationship to a foreign corporation's U.S. permanent establishment, the
income and gain on these assets be subject to treaty provisions that limit the United
States' ability to tax these items. Accordingly, to allow the United States to subject
the income and gain from elected assets to full net basis taxation, an election to treat
assets as effectively connected should be coupled with a waiver of any available treaty
benefits. Cf. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.897-6T(b)(2)(ii) (2003) (conditioning the
availability of nonrecognition treatment for certain foreign to foreign exchanges of
U.S. real property interests under FIRPTA on the waiver of certain treaty benefits).
240 The proposed and temporary regulations under section 884 contained a
limited version of this approach, allowing a foreign corporation to include as U.S.
assets certain investment assets that otherwise did not give rise to effectively
connected income. See former Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-IT(d)(11) (1988). Under
this provision, a foreign corporation could make an annual election to treat
marketable securities as U.S. assets in amount not greater than twenty-five percent of
the effectively connected E&P for the current and prior two years. The elected
securities were treated as U.S. assets only for the year of the election, with the income
from the securities being treated as effectively connected for the year following the
year of the election. The final branch profits tax did not include this expansion capital
election, instead substituting the liability reduction election as a means of providing
some relief from the automatic nature of the branch profits tax. See T.D. 8432, 1992-2
c.B. 157. Treasury abandoned the expansion capital election in the final regulations
because it proved to be ineffective in allowing foreign corporations to retain earnings
for expansion without the imposition of a current branch profits tax, given that
additional U.S. liabilities would be imputed on the invested earnings. See id. With
the liability reduction election (as modified by the proposals contained in this article),
the same problems would not exist under the proposal to expand the definition of
effectively connected assets, because a foreign corporation would be able to couple an
election to treat assets as effectively connected with an election to reduce liabilities,
and thereby generate a sufficient increase in U.S. net equity to avoid a current branch
profits tax liability.
The former expansion capital election and my proposal do differ in a major
respect. I am recommending that foreign corporations be permitted to treat
investment assets as effectively connected, limited by the amount necessary to reduce
the dividend equivalent amount to zero, in order to achieve parity with U.S.
subsidiary operations in the application of second-level taxes. In contrast, the
proposed and temporary regulations allowed a limited amount of marketable
securities to be treated temporarily as U.S. assets, as a way of permitting a temporary
investment of U.S. branch earnings in non-U.S. business assets. Other commentators
have similarly proposed expanding the definition of effectively connected assets to
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U.S. branch would then have a choice, and with nearly certain
results,241 of whether to incur a second-level tax or instead have the
income generated by invested earnings taxed by the United States on
a net basis.242
Along with this election to effectively connect assets, the Service
should have some ability to treat elected assets as non-U.S. assets in
order to approximate the application of the penalty taxes on
undistributed earnings in the U.S. subsidiary setting. In the atypical
circumstance where a privately-held foreign parent of a U.S.
subsidiary has one or more U.S. individual shareholders, the
accumulated earnings tax would be potentially applicable to the U.S.
subsidiary.243 Accordingly, for the analogous situation of a U.S.
branch of a privately-held foreign corporation having U.S. individual
shareholders, the Service should be able to treat elected assets as nonU.S. assets to the extent that the amount of elected assets is beyond
what is reasonably necessary for the foreign corporation's U.S.

include, upon election, investment assets in order to create parity between a U.S.
subsidiary and a U.S. branch. See, e.g., Peat Marwick Comments, supra note 16
(commenting on the proposed and temporary branch profits tax regulations and
pointing out that a U.S. subsidiary can dispose of part of its business and temporarily
invest the proceeds in marketable securities instead of distributing the funds to its
foreign parent).
241 See infra notes 243-52 and accompanying text.
242 As discussed earlier, it is possible that the presumption rule contained in the
asset-use test provides nonbanking branches with an ability to retain earnings similar
to that of U.S. subsidiaries. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
Consequently, it may be argued the proposed changes are not necessary to achieve
neutrality in this regard. However, even if the presumption rule allows for effectively
connected treatment of assets that are unrelated to meeting the present needs of the
U.S. business, foreign corporations should still be provided with the election to treat
investment assets generating U.S. source income as U.S. assets. The presumption
rule, with its fact-specific standards, does not provide the certainty of treatment that a
U.S. subsidiary typically has in retaining earnings. In this regard, branch profits tax
liability can arise unexpectedly where a foreign corporation unwittingly acquires nonU.S. assets, and the problem may become known only when the foreign corporation's
tax return is prepared. See Genz, supra note 61, at 135. Allowing U.S. branches to
elect U.S. asset treatment prior to the return due date would provide them with the
certainty of earnings retention that exists in the subsidiary setting. In addition,
providing foreign corporations with a straightforward election to retain earnings
would have simplification benefits for the government as well as taxpayers. Similar
considerations apply with regard to the contention that U.S. banking branches do not
need an election to effectively connect assets, because they currently have sufficient
flexibility in retaining earnings. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
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244
business.
Consideration should be given to applying this treatment
245
to U.S. branches of publicly-held foreign corporations as well. Such
reclassification by the Service would likely lead to a larger dividend
equivalent amount for the particular year, thus approximating the
second-level tax that would be imposed on a similarly situated U.S.
246
subsidiary under the accumulated earnings tax.
Alternatively, in
these situations, the Service could curb excessive accumulations in
elected assets by applying the accumulated earnings tax itself to the
foreign corporation.
Because the situations involve foreign
corporations with one or more U.S. individual shareholders, the
accumulated earnings tax generally should apply247 if the foreign
corporation accumulates earnings to avoid the individual income tax
248
on its shareholders.
244 For this purpose, the standard should be the same as under the accumulated
earnings tax. See infra note 311. In rare situations, the accumulated earnings tax also
would be potentially applicable to a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign parent with only
foreign shareholders. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. Consequently,
consideration should be given to allowing potential reclassification of elected assets
for analogous situations involving U.S. branches of foreign corporations with only
foreign shareholders. See supra note 87 for such analogous situations.
245 Where a widely-held foreign parent has some U.S. shareholders, it appears to
be very unlikely that a U.S. subsidiary of the foreign parent would be found to
accumulate earnings in order to avoid the individual tax on the foreign parent's U.S.
shareholders. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. Consequently, while
consideration should be given to applying the accumulated earnings tax analogue to
U.S. branches of widely-held foreign corporations, this may not be appropriate given
the treatment of similarly situated U.S. subsidiaries. Perhaps the analogue should
only apply where there is evidence that an unreasonable accumulation occurred in
order to benefit directly the U.S. shareholders of the widely-held foreign corporation.
246 This raises issues as to whether reclassified assets should nevertheless be
treated as effectively connected for regular tax purposes, as well as whether
modifications to the branch profits tax may be appropriate given that the accumulated
earnings tax can function as a third level of taxation. These issues are examined at
infra note 311.
247 See Treas. Reg. § 1.532-1(c) (1959) (stating that, among other circumstances,
the accumulated earnings tax is applicable to a foreign corporation if any of its
shareholders are U.S. citizens or residents); I.R.C. § 532(b) (noting that passive
foreign investment companies are excluded from the application of the accumulated
earnings tax).
248 However, the application of the accumulated earnings tax to a foreign
corporation may differ from the application of the tax to a U.S. subsidiary conducting
a U.S. business, the construct for a U.S. branch. This is because the former would
take into account the needs of any U.S. or foreign businesses of the foreign
corporation, whereas the latter may be limited to taking into account only the U.S.
business needs of the U.S. subsidiary. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.537-3(b) (1959) (providing
that under certain circumstances the business of a subsidiary may be considered the
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Similarly, the Service should be able to treat elected assets as nonV.S. assets in circumstances analogous to those where a similarly
situated V.S. subsidiary would be subject to the personal holding
249
company tax. Specifically, reclassification could occur for a taxable
year ("the current year") in situations where the gross income from all
elected assets (whether elected in the current year or any other year)
equals or exceeds sixty percent of the foreign corporation's effectively
connected gross income for the current year, provided more than fifty
percent of the foreign corporation's stock is owned (directly or
indirectly) by five or fewer individuals at any time during the last half
250
of the current year.
In this case, assets elected in the current year
would be reclassified as non- V .S. assets. As with the analogue to the
accumulated earnings tax, reclassification would likely increase the
dividend equivalent amount for the year,251 resulting in a second-level

business of the parent for purposes of applying the reasonable needs of the business
standard to the parent). But see Inland Terminals, Inc. v. U.S., 477 F.2d 836 (4th CiT.
1973) (holding that the reasonable business needs of a wholly-owned subsidiary
include the reasonable business needs of its parent). Thus, given the U.S. subsidiary
construct for a U.S. branch, it may be more appropriate to consider only the needs of
the U.S. business in curbing excess accumulations, which is what the accumulated
earnings tax analogue does. Of course, it would also be possible to modify the
application of the accumulated earnings tax to foreign corporations so as only to take
into account the needs of a foreign corporation's U.S. business.
249 As a result of a 2004 amendment, the personal holding company tax no longer
applies to foreign corporations. See 1.R.c. § 542(c)(5). Even before the 2004 change,
the personal holding company tax did not apply to a foreign corporation owned
entirely by nonresident aliens, either directly or indirectly through foreign entities.
See former 1.R.c. § 542(c)(7). Consequently, an analogue to the personal holding tax
is needed in order to treat U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries similarly with regard to
excessive accumulations. Excluded from the application of the personal holding
company tax are several types of corporations, including banks, life insurance
companies, and lending or finance companies. See 1.R.c. § 542(c). To promote
neutrality, there should be similar exclusions in applying the personal holding
company analogue to U.S. branches.
250 Cf supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
251 As with the analogue to the accumulated earnings tax, this raises issues as to
whether reclassified assets should nevertheless be treated as effectively connected for
regular tax purposes, as well as whether modifications to the branch profits tax may
be appropriate given that the personal holding company tax can function as a third
level of taxation. These issues are examined at infra note 311, in the context of an
analogue to the accumulated earnings tax that is contained in an alternative proposal
providing an effectively connected election. In this connection, a third level of tax is
less likely with the application of the personal holding tax as compared to the
accumulated earnings tax, because of the deficiency dividend procedure contained in
section 547; thus, there is less justification for modifying the branch profits tax for
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tax similar to imposing the personal holding company tax in the
252
subsidiary setting.
It may be contended that the election to treat assets as effectively
connected would result in the effective repeal of the branch profits
tax. With this feature, foreign corporations would often have the
ability to eliminate their liability under the branch profits tax by
electing to treat a sufficient amount of assets as being effectively
connected (possibly coupled with an election to reduce U.S.
liabilities). Nevertheless, the election would likely also produce a
cost, in that the income generated by the affected assets would be
subject to U.S. net basis taxation. While dividend-paying stock would
probably fare better under net basis taxation as compared to gross
basis taxation because of the dividends-received deduction,253 debt
instruments and growth stock would likely do worse tax-wise given
.
f
.255 un d er t h e
or'mterest 254 an d asset gams
t h e genera I exemptIOns
withholding tax. If, as alternatively suggested below, stock were
ineligible for effectively connected treatment,256 the election would
likely result in greater U.S. tax on the income produced by the
Consequently, the branch profits tax would
affected assets.257
continue to affect, albeit indirectly, the U.S. tax liability of foreign

purposes of implementing an analogue to the personal holding companying tax.
252 As an alternative to this rough analogue to the personal holding company tax,
consideration should be given towards developing a more precise analogue that
applies the details of the personal holding company tax to a U.S. branch. Cf supra
notes 94--98 and accompanying text. Such an approach could apply the specific rules
of the personal holding company tax, but only taking into account a foreign
corporation's effectively connected income. This could include the imposition of a
separate penalty tax on a foreign corporation's "undistributed effectively connected
personal holding company income," if the personal holding company ownership and
income tests are met. This more precise analogue could apply regardless of whether a
foreign corporation elects to treat assets as effectively connected.
253 See I.R.c. § 243.
254 See I.R.c. §§ 881(c), (d).
255 See I.R.c. § 881; Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(b) (2000).
256 See infra notes 274--78 and accompanying text.
257 If, however, the additional U.S. assets resulted in additional U.S.-connected
liabilities and therefore deductible interest, this would reduce the taxable income
generated by the additional assets. However, the foreign corporation may want to
reduce the amount of U.S.-connected liabilities (and U.S. liabilities) that would be
imputed to the additional U.S. assets in order to reduce its branch profits tax
exposure (by increasing its U.S. net equity). Moreover, there would be limits on a
foreign corporation's ability to use the effectively connected election to increase its
deductible interest. See infra notes 285-89 and accompanying text.
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corporations' U.S. branch operations,258and in a manner that is similar
to the way in which the dividend tax affects similarly situated U.S.
subsidiaries. Thus, similar to a U.S. subsidiary, a U.S. branch
generally would have a choice of whether to incur a branch profits tax
or instead have the income on the invested earnings subject to net
259
basis U.S. taxation.
2. Potential Policy Conflicts
a. Policies Underlying the Effectively Connected Income Rules
At first blush, it would appear that permitting foreign
corporations to elect effectively connected treatment of investment
assets that are unrelated to the conduct of the foreign corporation's
U.S. business would violate the policies underlying the effectively
connected income rules. After all, such a change arguably runs
counter to section 864(c)(2), which, as explicated by its legislative
history, appears to require a factual connection between the income
(or underlying asset) and the activities of the foreign corporation's
U.S. trade or business in order for U.S. source capital gain or FDAP
260
income to be effectively connected. Indeed, a statutory amendment
261
to this section may well be required to effectuate this change.
However, a closer examination suggests that such an expansion of
effectively connected assets does not appear to implicate the concerns
that led to the adoption of a factual connection standard for subjecting
income on investment assets to net basis taxation.

258 In this regard, another reason for the branch profits may have been to
generate revenue gains by encouraging the reinvestment of U.S. branch earnings. See
Blessing, supra note 46, at 589.
259 See supra text accompanying notes 155-60.
260 See S. REp. No. 1707, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS. (1966), reprinted in 1966-2 C.B.
1055; H.R. REP. No. 1450, supra note 133.
261 That is, Treasury may lack the power to effectuate the change by amending
the regulations under section 864(c). In this regard, the House and Senate reports in
explaining the application of section 864(c)(2) state "[t]hus, for example, are the
assets held for future, or remittent, use in the business?" See S. REP. No. 1707, supra
note 260, at 1072; H.R. REP. No. 1450, supra note 130, at 977. This would appear to
exclude investment assets that have no connection to the foreign corporation's U.S.
business. On the other hand, Treasury felt that it had the power to promulgate the
former expansion capital election (contained in the former temporary branch tax
regulations), which likewise did not require a relationship between the holding of the
elected assets and the conduct of the U.S. business. See supra note 240.
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Prior to the enactment of section 864(c)(2), a foreign person with
a U.S. business was subject to net basis taxation on all of its U.S.
262
source income, under the so-called "force of attraction" rule.
Several concerns led Congress to adopt the factual connection
standard contained in section 864(c)(2) in place of the force of
attraction rule for U.S. source investment income. First, Congress was
concerned that the force of attraction rule distorted a foreign
corporation's decision of whether to engage in business or invest in
263
the United States. This rule may have deterred foreign corporations
with U.S. source investment income from engaging in a U.S. business
because doing so would subject the investment income to net basis
264
taxation without any applicable treaty reductions in the tax rate.
Similarly, the force of attraction rule may also have deterred a foreign
265
corporation with a U.S business from investing in the United States.
Congress also believed that the substantial difference in the tax
treatment of U.S. investment income, depending on the existence (or
not) of an unrelated U.S. business, was both inequitable and
. I 266
1·11 oglca.
In addition, Congress wanted to ensure that U.S. source dividends
267
Net basis taxation of
generally are fully subject to U.S. tax.
dividends provides a foreign corporation with a dividends-received
deduction, which removes at least seventy percent of the dividend
268
Also, prior to the enactment of the branch
from the taxable base.
profits tax,269 there rarely was a second-level U.S. tax on the dividends
when these amounts were ultimately distributed to the shareholders of

262 See H.R. REP. No. 1450, supra note 133, 1966-2 c.B. at 972; Harvey P. Dale,
Effectively Connected Income, 42 TAX L. REV. 689, 690 (1987).
263 See H.R. REP. No. 1450, supra note 133, 1966-2 C.B. at 976.
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 See id.
267 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-40-005 (May 15, 1989) (referring to a May 13,
1966 statement by Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of Treasury, before the Senate
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Tax Conventions, for proposition that Congress
intentionally drew the effectively connected test narrowly because of concern over the
ability of foreign corporations to effectively connect dividends and thereby take
advantage of the dividends-received deduction to virtually eliminate U.S. tax on the
dividends).
268 See
1.R.c. § 243(a). At the time that section 864(c)(2) was enacted,
section 243 generally provided for an eighty-five percent dividends-received
deduction. See former 1.R.c. § 243(a) (1964).
269 This was the case when Congress adopted section 864(c)(2).
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270

the foreign corporation.
Consequently, the factual connection
standard contained in section 864(c)(2) was aimed in part at
channeling most U.S. source dividends to gross basis taxation under
the U.S. sourcefFDAP regime,271 so as to include the full amount of
the dividend in the taxable base.
Providing an election to treat assets as effectively connected does
not appear to implicate the concerns that led to the adoption of the
factual connection standard contained in section 864(c)(2). First,
foreign corporations should not be deterred from engaging in business
or investing in the United States because they always can refrain from
electing effectively connected status for the investments. This
nonelection would subject the investment income to the tax under
section 881(a) (including any exemptions or exceptions) along with
any applicable treaty reductions.272
Also, allowing a foreign
corporation to elect net basis taxation for investment income does not
appear to be inequitable or illogical, given that a foreign corporation
with a U.S. subsidiary can effectively do the same by having the U.S.
273
subsidiary hold the investments.
Finally, it would appear that elective net basis taxation of U.S.
dividends (with a corresponding dividends-received deduction) is not
inconsistent with Congress's desire to have U.S. source dividends fully
taxed in most cases. Unlike the ineffective second-level U.S. tax that
existed upon the enactment of section 864(c)(2), the dividends
generally will be fully subject to a second-level U.S. tax under the
branch profits tax when treated as remitted outside of the United
274
States.
Although prior dividends may escape a second-level tax
upon a tax-free termination of the U.S. branch,275 this is no different
than the tax treatment of dividends received by a U.S. subsidiary
where the subsidiary liquidates into its foreign parent before making
nonliquidating distributions of the earnings generated by the prior

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
To the extent not effectively connected, U.S. source dividends are generally
taxable under section 881(a).
272 This assumes that the income is not otherwise effectively connected.
273 As mentioned earlier, however, the legislative history to section 864(c)(2)
indicates that Congress was concerned with subjecting investment income to net basis
taxation based on the existence of an unrelated U.S. business conducted by the
taxpayer. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
274 While not indicated in the legislative history, the lack of an effective secondlevel U.S. tax under prior law may have been an important factor in Congress's
decision to limit the ability to have U.S. source dividends subject to net basis taxation.
275 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
270

271
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276
Nevertheless, if one desires greater assurance of fully
dividends.
taxing U.S. source dividends, an alternative would be to exclude stock
investments from the election to effectively connect assets. Possibly
for this reason,277 Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2) generally excludes stock
as an asset that is eligible for effectively connected treatment under
278
the asset use test.
b. Other Policies
The proposal to provide foreign corporations with an election to
effectively connect assets may also raise concerns of administrability.
As discussed above, along with the election to treat investment assets
as effectively connected, the Service should have some ability to treat
elected assets as being noneffectively connected,279 which may further
complicate the application of the branch profits tax. In particular,
reclassification pursuant to the analogue to the accumulated earnings
tax would require a determination of whether the investment is held
to meet the reasonable needs of the foreign corporation's U.S.
business,280 which would entail the somewhat nebulous standards and
potential enforceability difficulties that arguably plague the
281
accumulated earnings tax. Nevertheless, the administrative burdens
should be minimal in light of the limited situations where this type of
reclassification may apply.282 Moreover, the ability to elect effectively
connected status for investment assets should reduce the number of
situations where it is necessary to apply the asset-use test and its "held
for the present needs" standard, along with its presumption rule.283

See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
Another, and probably more important, reason for excluding stock as an
effectively connected asset under the asset-use test may be to prevent foreign
corporations from effectively imputing interest deductions to assets that may not be
producing current income. See infra notes 285-89 and accompanying text for a
discussion of possible taxpayer manipulation of the interest deduction under Treas.
Reg. § 1.882-5 with an elective effectively connected rule for investment assets.
278 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iii)(a) (2005).
A recent amendment to the
asset-use test removes the exclusion with respect to certain stock held by foreign
insurance companies. See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iii)(b) (2005); supra note 116.
279 See supra notes 243-52 and accompanying text.
280 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
281 See infra note 323.
282 See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
283 This is true because taxpayers desiring effectively connected treatment for
investment assets would presumably be electing such treatment, rather than having
the determination made under the asset-use test.
276

277
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These tests can be uncertain in their application, and therefore
284
Consequently,
avoiding them should make administration easier.
the suggested expansion of effectively connected assets should not
result in significant administrative burdens, and may indeed serve to
simplify the administration of the tax rules applying to U.S. branches.
Potential taxpayer manipulation may be another concern with a
rule allowing for effectively connected treatment for investment assets
upon a taxpayer's election. Specifically, foreign corporations may
strategically elect effectively connected status for investment assets in
order to increase their interest expense deduction under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.882-5. By increasing the amount of U.S. assets via the election,
more interest expense would be imputed to a foreign corporation's
U.S. branch;285 yet, because the additional U.S. assets may yield little
or no current taxable income, the election could result in lower
286
If stock were
amounts of effectively connected taxable income.
excluded as an asset eligible for elective effectively connected
treatment, an alternative suggested above,287 the potential for such
manipulation would be reduced.
A straightforward way of
eliminating any possibility for manipulation would be to decline to
impute liabilities on assets elected for effectively connected
288
Regardless, a foreign corporation should not be
treatment.
permitted to elect effectively connected treatment for a greater
amount of assets than is necessary to reduce its dividend equivalent
amount to zero for a particular year; neutrality in the application of
second-level taxes requires no more than this. Moreover, the earnings
stripping rule may apply to cap the amount of currently deductible
interest. 289

284 See supra notes 111-16, 125-33 and accompanying text; see, e.g., I.R.S. Tech.
Adv. Mem. 89-40-005 (May 15, 1989), I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 77-29-027 (Mar. 29,
1977).
285 See supra note 43 for a discussion of Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5.
286 This appears to be Treasury's concern in taking the position in the regulations
that stock generally cannot be effectively connected under the asset-use test. See
Katz & Plambeck, supra note 213, at A-47.
287 See supra notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
288 Indeed, in many cases foreign corporations may desire this result in order to
increase their U.S. net equity and thereby lower their dividend equivalent amount.
Thus, in the absence of a rule that does not impute U.S. liabilities on elected assets,
foreign corporations may want to achieve the same result by coupling an effectively
connected election with an election to reduce U.S. liabilities.
289 See 1.R.c. § 163(j); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.163(j)-8, 52 FR 24,996, 24,999 (July 2,
1987).
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E. Election to Treat Assets as Effectively Connected with Changes to
the Accumulated Earnings Tax
As noted above, the proposal to provide foreign corporations
with an election to treat investment assets generating U.S. source
income as effectively connected assets assumes that there are no
changes with regard to the application of the accumulated earnings
290
Under current law, the accumulated earnings tax apparently
tax.
would rarely even apply potentially to a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign
corporation. If a change does occur, such that the accumulated
earnings tax would be potentially applicable in all cases in the U.S.
subsidiary setting, this section recommends that foreign corporations
be permitted an election to treat U.S. source investment assets as
effectively connected, provided the assets are held to meet the
reasonable needs of the foreign corporation's U.S. business.
1. Possible Change in the Application of the Accumulated Earnings

Tax to U.S. Subsidiaries
As previously discussed, in the typical situation involving a U.S.
subsidiary of a foreign corporation, the accumulated earnings tax
apparently would not even potentially apply, regardless of whether
earnings are accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of the
subsidiary's business. The regulations under this tax require a
purpose to avoid the imposition of the individual income tax on the
subsidiary's shareholders (either direct or indirect), and this purpose
is very likely not to exist with respect to a wholly owned U.S.
subsidiary of a privately-held foreign corporation with no individual
U.S. shareholders (which should be the norm). Moreover, even
though a widely-held foreign corporation may well have some U.S.
shareholders, it appears very unlikely that its U.S. subsidiary would be
found to accumulate earnings for the purpose of avoiding the
individual tax on the foreign parent's U.S. shareholders. Thus, most
U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations would appear to be able to
retain earnings without the limitations imposed pursuant to the
·
accumu Iate d earmngs
tax. 291
Effectively exempting most U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
corporations from the accumulated earnings tax is a questionable

See supra note 234.
For a more complete explanation of the application of the accumulated
earnings tax in the subsidiary setting, see supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
290

291
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·
· 292 A purpose of t he accumulate d
po1ICy.
earmngs
tax is to provide a
backstop to the shareholder-level tax by forcing the payment of
293
dividends. This purpose is certainly relevant in the context of a U.S.
subsidiary of a foreign corporation, regardless of who owns the
foreign parent; without potential liability under the accumulated
earnings tax, the U.S. subsidiary may have little incentive to payout
dividends, especially since earnings can usually be repatriated tax-free
to the foreign parent on the liquidation of the subsidiary.294 Indeed,
several commentators appear to be of the view that the accumulated
earnings tax is fully applicable in the context of a wholly owned U.S.
subsidiary of a foreign corporation, presumably because of the
295
purpose of the tax. Moreover, the current rule produces seemingly
arbitrary results, in that a U.S. subsidiary owned directly by foreign
individuals would have potential liability under accumulated earnings
2
tax. % There appears to be no sensible reason for protecting the
dividend tax in this case but not where the shareholder is a foreign
corporation, especially given that the dividend tax rate under the
297
Code would typically be the same in both situations.
Treasury may not have intended this result in originally crafting Treas. Reg.
Because a corporate shareholder would generally be entitled to a
dividends-received deduction with respect to distributed earnings, the accumulated
earnings tax has traditionally focused on avoidance of the dividend tax with respect to
individual shareholders. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 91, at 7-6. Accordingly,
the regulations refer to the purpose of avoiding the imposition of the individual
income tax on shareholders. However, because a foreign corporation receiving a
dividend would generally not be entitled to a dividends-received deduction, requiring
a purpose to avoid the individual income tax seems inappropriate in the context of a
foreign shareholder. Treasury may simply have overlooked this situation when
originally writing the regulation. Nevertheless, Treasury could have amended the
regulation to cover a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation; indeed, Treasury did
propose such an amendment, but it was subsequently withdrawn. See infra note 298.
293 See 2 JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION,
C3-22 to -23 (2005); STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
TAXATION 648 (6th ed. 2005).
294 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
295 See Brown, supra note 4, at 158 n.141; Feingold & Berg, supra note 46, at 21920; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 162, 164; KUNTZ & PERONI, supra
note 293, at C3-22 to -23.
296 Cf AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 164 (stating that it is
appropriate to apply the accumulated earnings tax to a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign
corporation, because the withholding tax borne by the parent on dividends from the
subsidiary may be regarded as a surrogate for the individual shareholder tax that
would have been imposed if the individual shareholders had directly owned the U.S.
corporation).
297 For both nonresident aliens and foreign corporations, the Code generally
292

§ 1.532-1(a)(1).
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It may be appropriate then to modify the accumulated earnings
tax so that it potentially applies in all cases involving U.S. subsidiaries
of foreign corporations. To this end, Treasury apparently could revise
the regulations to provide that a purpose to avoid the section 881 tax
would also trigger the imposition of the accumulated earnings tax, or
298
Congress could amend the statute to so provide.
If this were to
occur, a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation would very likely be
subject to an accumulated earnings tax liability if it retained earnings
299
beyond the reasonable needs of its business.
2. Promoting Neutrality
With this modification to accumulated earnings tax, differences
would still exist in the abilities of U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries
to control the timing and impact of second-level taxes, with no
changes to the branch profits tax other than those recommended with
respect to the liability reduction election. Aside from reducing its
U.S. liabilities, a foreign corporation could avoid a branch profits tax
on its U.S. branch earnings to the extent that it invested the earnings
3OO
in U.S. assets. In contrast, a similarly situated U.S. subsidiary could
imposes a thirty percent withholding tax with respect to dividends received from a
U.S. corporation. See I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a), 1441(a), 1442(a), 861(a)(2); supra
note 26 and accompanying text. A full or partial exemption from the withholding tax
applies to dividends from U.S. corporations with substantial foreign business
activities. See 1.R.c. §§ 871(i)(2)(B), 881(d), 861(c), 1441(c)(1O), 1442(a). In very
limited circumstances, dividends received by foreign persons may be treated as
effectively connected income, in which case the applicable tax rates would be based
on the graduated rates under sections 1 and 11, and a foreign corporate recipient
See 1.R.c.
would generally be entitled to a dividends-received deduction.
§§ 864(c)(2), 871(b), 882(a), 882(c), 243(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(5)
(2005); supra note 116 and accompanying text.
298 Indeed, Treasury once proposed an amendment to the regulations that would
have provided for this treatment, although it ultimately withdrew the proposed
amendment without explanation. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.532-1(a)(1), 45 Fed. Reg.
84,088 (Dec. 22, 1980), withdrawn, 48 Fed. Reg. 25,228 (June 6, 1983). Treasury
would appear to have the authority to amend the regulation in this manner; the
statute does not expressly limit the purpose to the avoidance of the individual tax,
although such a limitation may be implied by the statutory language. See 1.R.c.
§ 532(a) ("purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders or the
shareholders of any other corporation").
299 See 1.R.c. § 533(a).
300 See supra notes 101-20 and accompanying text.
As noted earlier, while it
appears very unlikely that foreign corporations conducting U.S. banking businesses
would exhaust their ability to use the expanded liability reduction election, foreign
corporations conducting nonbanking activities in the United States may well be
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avoid a dividend tax as well as an accumulated earnings tax by
investing its earnings in assets that are held to meet the reasonable
3D1
needs of its U.S. business.
With these different standards, it is not clear which structure
affords greater flexibility in retaining earnings, the determination
being dependent on an interpretation of the rules and the particular
facts. For example, with regard to U.S. branches not engaged in a
banking business, investment-type assets generally need to be held to
meet the present needs of the U.S. business in order to be effectively
302
Under this rule, a U.S. branch would have less
connected assets.
flexibility in retaining earnings than a similarly situated U.S.
subsidiary, which could hold investment assets for future U.S. business
303
However, the rules applicable
needs and avoid a second-level tax.
to non banking branches also provide for a presumption of effectively
connected treatment where an asset was acquired with funds
generated by that business, the income from the asset is reinvested or
retained in that business, and U.S. branch personnel significantly
304
It is unclear
managed and controlled the investment of the asset.
whether the Service can rebut the presumption by demonstrating that
305
the asset is not held to meet the present needs of the U.S. business.
If so, then a U.S. subsidiary would appear to have greater flexibility in
retaining earnings, as it could hold assets for future U.S. business
needs and avoid a second-level tax. If the presumption is not
rebuttable by the Service, a U.S. branch qualifying for the
presumption may have the greater flexibility, given that it may be able
to hold assets (excluding stock generally) without regard to business
306
need and avoid a branch profits tax.
limited in their ability to accumulate earnings pursuant to the election. See supra note
225.
301 See generally 1.R.c. §§ 531-533; infra note 311. The accumulated earnings tax
generally allows a corporation to retain during its lifetime a minimum of $250,000 of
earnings without regard to business need (which is referred to as the minimum
accumulated earnings credit). See 1.R.c. § 535(c)(2).
302 See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
303 See infra note 311; Musher, supra note 45, at 112-13 (pointing out that foreign
corporations operating through U.S. subsidiaries have greater flexibility to
accumulate earnings for future needs than do those operating through U.S. branches
that are apparently subject to the branch profits tax when they accumulate earnings
for future needs).
304 See supra note 115.
305 See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
306 The foreign corporation would still need to satisfy the other requirements of
the presumption rule for the assets to be effectively connected; in particular, the
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For U.S. banking branches and subsidiaries, their relative
flexibility in retaining earnings would depend on the particular facts.
Under the special banking rules, a U.S. banking branch can effectively
connect a limited amount of certain investment securities, typically
long-term corporate bonds and municipal government bonds, as well
as an unlimited amount of other securities such as short-term
corporate bonds and U.S. government bonds; U.S. banking branches
can do so whether or not the securities are held for present or future
30
business needs. ? Consequently, for accumulations in securities
consisting of long-term corporate or municipal bonds beyond a U.S.
branch's investment securities limit, a U.S. subsidiary may have the
greater flexibility, as it would be able to retain earnings in these types
308
of securities if it has a reasonable business need. In contrast, a U.S.
branch could not do so even with such a need. Nevertheless, a U.S.
branch could retain earnings in short-term corporate and U.S.
government bonds without regard to any tax limitations. For
accumulations up to the investment securities limit (and greater than
09
the minimum accumulated earnings credie ), the U.S. branch would
have the greater flexibility, as it could retain earnings in any of these
securities regardless of need, whereas a U.S. subsidiary could only do
310
so if it has a reasonable business need for the accumulation.
To make the application of the branch profits and dividend taxes
more equivalent, U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries should have a
similar ability to retain U.S. earnings while avoiding a second-level
tax.
Accordingly, with the above-described change to the
accumulated earnings tax, a foreign corporation with a U.S. branch
should be permitted an election to treat investment assets producing
U.S. source income as being effectively connected, provided the assets
are held to meet the reasonable needs of the foreign corporation's
311
U.S. business.
For this purpose, the reasonable business needs
income from the assets would need to be reinvested or retained in the U.S. business.
See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
307 See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
308 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-22-009 (May 29, 1998) (applying the
accumulated earnings tax to a bank, and examining the bank's business need for
retaining earnings in liquid assets such as cash, cash deposits with the federal reserve
system, and taxable and tax-exempt securities).
309 See supra note 30l.
310 Cf I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-22-009 (May 29, 1998).
311 Cf Feingold & Berg, supra note 46, at 220 (appearing to recommend an
election to treat assets as effectively connected to the extent of the amount of
reasonable future anticipated needs of the foreign corporation's U.S. business;
apparently calling for an interest charge on certain portions of the branch profits tax
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standard should be the same as under the accumulated earnings tax.3I2
liability that are deferred as a result of such treatment).
If elected assets are not held for the reasonable needs of the business conducted
by the U.S. branch, the assets would be disqualified for effectively connected
treatment for purposes of the branch profits tax. However, it would appear that the
assets should still be considered as generating effectively connected income for
regular tax purposes. This would be consistent with an application of the
accumulated earnings tax in the context of a U.S. subsidiary, where earnings subject
to the penalty tax continue to remain in corporate solution, and thereby generate
income subject to net basis taxation by the United States (if invested in incomeproducing assets). In a similar vein, modifications to the workings of the branch
profits tax may be appropriate given that the accumulated earnings tax can function
as a third level of taxation. See James C. Warner & Lauren T. Byrne, Accumulated
Earnings Tax, 796-2nd T.M. (BNA) at A-l. That is, following the imposition of the
accumulated earnings tax on a corporation's retained earnings, a shareholder level tax
would normally be imposed on these earnings when they are ultimately distributed to
the corporation's shareholders (either in the nonliquidating or liquidating context).
Nevertheless, a third level of tax is mitigated somewhat in the case of a U.S.
subsidiary of a foreign corporation, given that a liquidating distribution generally
would not be subject to a shareholder level tax. See supra note 146 and accompanying
text. Therefore, there may not be a strong need to modify the branch profits tax in
order to achieve parity with the application of the accumulated earnings and
shareholder level taxes in the subsidiary setting. If modifications were to occur, I
suggest that solely for purposes of reducing accumulated effectively connected E&P
by the dividend equivalent amount for the year of the asset election, see Treas. Reg.
§ 1.884-1(b)(3)(ii) (1996), the dividend equivalent amount should exclude the amount
of disqualified elected assets; as a result, the amount of disqualified elected assets
would not be removed from accumulated effectively connected E&P. This would be
similar to the application of the accumulated earnings tax, where retained earnings
subject to the penalty tax are not removed from ·E&P. I also suggest that assets that
are disqualified for the year of the election nevertheless be treated as U.S. assets for
determining dividend equivalent amounts for subsequent years (regardless of whether
the assets are held for the reasonable needs of the U.S. business). This would be
consistent with not reducing accumulated effectively connected E&P by the amount
of disqualified assets, and would result in a third level of tax (pursuant to the branch
profits tax) if the elected assets were subsequently sold and the proceeds were
invested in assets beyond the scope of net basis U.S. taxation, similar to a U.S.
subsidiary's nonliquidating distribution of earnings previously subject to the
accumulated earnings tax.
312 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1, -2 (1986).
In this regard, the regulations
include the following grounds, if supported by sufficient facts, as possibly satisfying
the reasonable business needs standard: (i) providing for business expansion or plant
replacement, (ii) acquiring a business enterprise, (iii) providing for the retirement of
indebtedness created in connection with the business, (iv) providing for necessary
working capital for the business, (v) providing for investments or loans to suppliers or
customers if needed to maintain the business, and (vi) providing for the payment of
reasonably anticipated product liability losses. See Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(b) (1986).
Given the number of foreign corporations that conduct banking or insurance
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In addition, similar to the minimum accumulated earnings credit,3!3 a
foreign corporation with a U.S. branch generally should be permitted
to elect during its existence at least $250,000 of U.S. source assets as
being effectively connected, regardless of whether the assets are held
3
for the reasonable needs of the U.S. business. !4 To ensure that U.S.
branches would not have greater flexibility than U.S. subsidiaries in
retaining earnings, the presumption rule should be eliminated (at least
for foreign corporations), since this provision may not require a
3
Also,
business need in order to effectively connect assets. !5
consideration should be given to eliminating the ability of U.S.
banking branches to effectively connect investment securities that
have no relationship to the U.S business (other than participation by
U.S. branch personnel in arranging for the acquisition of the
securities).3!6 This elimination should be considered despite the
administrative benefits of the current rule, which does not require a

businesses through U.S. branches, see supra note 205, it may be wise for Treasury and
the Service to issue regulations or rulings specifically applying the reasonable business
needs standard to these situations. In this regard, I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-22-009,
supra note 308, applies the accumulated earnings tax to a bank, and in doing so
examines reasonable business needs in this context, such as the need to maintain
sufficient capital to satisfy Federal Reserve requirements, along with other grounds
for reasonable accumulations that are set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(b).
313 See supra note 301.
314 Cf Feingold & Berg, supra note 46, at 220 (appearing to recommend an
election to treat assets as effectively connected to the extent of the amount of
reasonable future anticipated needs of the foreign corporation's U.S. business, or
minimum amount, if greater, with such minimum amount possibly equal to the
minimum accumulated earnings credit under the accumulated earnings tax). The
minimum accumulated earnings credit is reduced to $150,000 for corporations whose
principal function is performing services in the field of law, accounting, consulting,
actuarial science, health, engineering, architecture, or performing arts. See 1.R.c.
§ 535(c)(2). Similarly, for U.S. branches performing such services, the minimum
amount of assets that can be elected as effectively connected should be reduced to
$150,000.
315 See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text. With the elimination of the
presumption rule, there is the possibility that a foreign corporation could avoid U.S.
net basis taxation on certain income that was previously covered - for example,
interest income satisfying the presumption requirements where the foreign
corporation cannot demonstrate that the underlying asset was not held for present
U.S. business needs. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text. Nevertheless,
because a foreign corporation typically could avoid the presumption rule if it so
desires by failing intentionally one of its requirements, eliminating the presumption
rule should not create a material advantage for taxpayers wanting to avoid effectively
connected treatment.
316 See supra notes 307-10 and accompanying text.
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determination of a business need for holding the securities.317
Like the primary proposal, the alternative proposal to expand the
definition of effectively connected assets would no more result in the
effective repeal of the branch profits tax than the ability of a
subsidiary to accumulate earnings results in the effective repeal of the
dividend tax. With the alternative proposal (as well as the primary
proposal), the branch profits tax would continue to affect the U.S. tax
liability of foreign corporations' U.S. branch operations, in that the
election to effectively connect assets would likely also produce a cost
by subjecting the income from the affected assets to U.S. net basis

317 In this regard, the concept of the investment securities rule, allowing a certain
percentage of U.S. banking branch assets to consist of investment securities, may be
consistent with an application of a reasonable business needs standard to a banking
branch, given the need to satisfy reserve or similar requirements (although the special
banking rules do contain a provision that can allow for the effectively connected
treatment of stocks or securities held for the purpose of satisfying reserve
requirements established by United States banking authorities. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.864-4(c)(5)(ii)(a)(3) (2005)); cf I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-22-009, supra note 308
(discussing the maintenance of adequate capital to satisfy Federal Reserve
requirements as a reasonable business need for banks); Rubinstein & Yu, supra note
152, at 67-68 (referring to securities treated as effectively connected under the
investment securities rule as used to satisfy reserve or similar requirements).
Accordingly, a modification of the investment securities rule may be appropriate in
order to approximate a reasonable business needs determinant if the current rule
does not adequately do so. Aside from the presumption rule and the ability of
banking branches to effectively connect investment securities, the effectively
connected rules appear to be consistent with the reasonable business needs standard
under the accumulated earnings tax, as these rules require that assets either be held
for present business needs (in the case of the asset-use test) or directly relate to the
operation of the U.S. business (in the case of the business activities test, special
banking rules with regard to loans, or foreign effectively connected rules). See supra
notes 103-38 and accompanying text. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.864-4 (2005),
1.864-5 (1997), 1.864-6 (1972).
As noted earlier, some consideration should be given to excluding foreign banks
from having the election to effectively connect investment assets. See supra note 234.
Nevertheless, under this alternative proposal for an effectively connected election, it
may be appropriate to include foreign banks even if that is not the case under the
primary proposal. This is because the alternative proposal also may call for the
elimination of the ability of foreign banks to effectively connect investment securities
having no relationship to the U.S. business (as discussed above). Thus, this proposal
may result in limiting a U.S. banking branch's ability to retain earnings.
Consequently, the alternative proposal arguably should apply to U.S. banking
branches so that they do not have more flexibility in retaining earnings than do
similarly situated U.S. subsidiaries, even though in both cases second-level taxes may
be avoidable by reducing liabilities that are taken into account for U.S. tax purposes.
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taxation. Moreover, as compared to the primary proposal, a foreign
corporation would have less ability to eliminate its liability under the
branch profits tax by electing to treat a sufficient amount of assets as
being effectively connected, because of the requirement that the
319
assets be held for the reasonable needs of the U.S. business.
3. Potential Policy Conflicts
The alternative proposal to provide foreign corporations with an
election to effectively connect assets gives rise to potential conflicts
with recognized policies that are similar both in their type and
resolution to those raised by the primary proposal. In this regard, the
alternative proposal should not conflict with the policies underlying
the effectively connected income rules, especially if stock is not
320
eligible for election.
Indeed, because the assets would need to be
held for the reasonable needs of the U.S. business in order to be
eligible for effectively connected treatment, the alternative proposal
may even be consistent with the language of section 864(c)(2)(A),
which takes into account whether the assets are used or held for use in
the conduct of the U.S. business.321

See supra notes 253-59 and accompanying text.
319 As with the primary proposal, the alternative proposal also should contain the
analogue to the personal holding company tax that is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 249-252. As a result, the Service could prevent excessive
accumulations of effectively connected E&P by treating elected assets as non-U.S.
assets based on either an objective standard (the personal holding company tax
analogue) or a subjective standard (the accumulated earnings tax analogue), similar
to the application of the penalty taxes in the case of a U.S. subsidiary.
320 See supra notes 272-78 and accompanying text.
321 A "reasonable needs of the U.S. business" standard, which includes assets
held for future expansion, may well be consistent with the language of the committee
reports. See S. REP. No. 1707, supra note 260,1966-2 C.B. at 1072 (stating "[t]hus, for
example, are the assets held for future, or remittent, use in the business?"); H.R. REP.
No. 1450, supra note 130, 1966-2 c.B. at 977 (same). In particular, the House
technical explanation focuses on the connection between the asset and the needs of
the U.S. business, without limiting this to present needs. While the examples
provided are consistent with a present business needs approach, they do not appear to
foreclose taking into account future business needs in determining effectively
connected status. See H.R. REP. No. 1450, supra note 130, 1966-2 C.B. at 1008-1009.
Nevertheless, the regulations reject such an approach, and instead interpret the
statute as requiring a present business need in order to effectively connect assets and
income under the asset-use test (subject to the presumption rule, which is discussed at
supra notes 115, 128-33 and accompanying text). See supra notes 113-14,126-27 and
accompanying text.
318
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As with the primary proposal, there would be limits on the ability
of a foreign corporation to strategically elect effectively connected
status for investment assets in order to increase its interest expense
deduction under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5. These would include the
possible nonimputation of liabilities on assets affected by the election,
an annual cap on the amount of assets eligible for the election (no
greater than the amount needed to reduce the dividend equivalent
amount to zero), as well as restrictions on the amount of currently
deductible interest pursuant to the earnings stripping rule.322
Moreover, the alternative proposal would contain an additional curb
on possible manipulation resulting from the requirement that elected
assets be held for the reasonable needs of the foreign corporation's
U.S. business.
The alternative proposal would cause greater concerns of
administrability as compared to primary proposal. This results from
requiring a determination of whether an investment is held to meet
the reasonable needs of the foreign corporation's U.S. business. This
determination would incorporate the test used under the accumulated
earnings tax, which involves somewhat vague standards and potential
323
Nevertheless, the ability to elect
enforceability difficulties.
effectively connected status for investment assets should reduce the
number of situations where it is necessary to apply the asset-use test
and its fact specific standards,324 which may be equally vague and
325
difficult to apply and enforce.
Consequently, the alternative
proposal for providing an election to effectively connect assets may
result mostly in administrative tradeoffs rather than additional
burdens.

v.

CONCLUSION

The branch profits tax is founded on the policy of tax neutrality
with respect to the form of conducting a business, yet as currently
See supra notes 285-89 and accompanying text.
323 See Warner & Byrne, supra note 311, at A-I (pointing out that the
accumulated earnings tax is rarely imposed on most corporations, and that the
Service's failure to recognize situations when the tax applies is due to the complexities
of determining the necessary intent to avoid the shareholder level tax, as well as
accounting rules and calculations for E&P and reasonable business needs).
324 This is true because taxpayers desiring effectively connected treatment for
investment assets may be electing such treatment under the more liberal reasonable
business needs standard, rather than having the determination made under the assetuse test's present business needs standard.
325 See supra note 284.
322
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implemented the provision does not adequately advance this concept.
This article proposes several changes to the branch profits tax that
both promote neutrality and are consistent with other recognized
policies governing the taxation of U.S. branches of foreign
corporations. Specifically, I recommend the following reforms: (i)
eliminate the potential for recapture upon the termination of a U.S.
branch where a foreign corporation elects to reduce its U.S. liabilities,
(ii) remove the U.S. booked liability limitation under the election to
reduce U.S. liabilities, and (iii) provide foreign corporations with an
election to treat investments generating U.S. source income as
326
With these changes, foreign
effectively connected assets.
corporations with U.S. branches generally would have a choice of
whether to incur a second-level tax or instead have (or continue to
have) the income on invested earnings taxed by the United States on a
net basis. Thus, the branch profits tax would function more like the
dividend tax in the U.S. subsidiary setting, thereby promoting the
neutrality goals underlying the provision.

326 Consideration should be given to excluding stock as an asset that is eligible for
elective effectively connected treatment. A foreign corporation should not be
permitted to elect effectively connected treatment for a greater amount of assets than
is necessary to reduce its dividend equivalent amount to zero for a particular year.
The proposal to provide foreign corporations with an election to effectively
connect investment assets assumes that there are no changes in applying the
accumulated earnings tax to a V.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation. If a change
does occur so that the accumulated earnings tax is potentially applicable in all cases to
a wholly owned V.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation, this article recommends that
the election be available only for V.S. source investment assets that are held to meet
the reasonable needs of the foreign corporation's V.S. business.
Some consideration should be given to excluding foreign banks under both the
primary and alternative proposals for providing an effectively connected election.

